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Introduction
“Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored.”
Aldous Huxley
In the light of the information age, immense amounts of information on almost every topic
and from numerous sources are easily accessible and provided even when people do not ask for
it. People are often exposed to information about their environment, abilities, health, past, present
and future. With this overload of information, to filter and choose what they really want to know,
people must put time and energy on seeking, avoiding and processing information. This means,
being ignorant or informed about something is a choice, with time and processing power being
the important constraints. One important question to answer to be able to understand changes in
the social and economic interactions is: how do people decide what they want to know and to not
know?
Research in economics and psychology show a clear pattern of behavior for information
choice: people want to know things that make them feel good, and to not know things that make
them feel bad. People may feel good or bad about many kinds of information and particularly
“news” about one’s own abilities, inner traits, dispositions and intelligence can fall in both cate-
gories. People often enjoy learning that they are seen as a good person and liked by others, have
higher abilities and are more successful than they believed. As it might be pleasant to learn such
positive things, when the information contains a judgment that contradicts one’s own existing be-
liefs, it may bring disutility to the acquirer. If the disutility is anticipated in advance, people may
choose not to know certain things by avoiding information. Andries and Haddad (2020) describe
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this behavior as “closing eyes to avoid the stress of the roller coaster of life”.
In many real life situations people tend to shape their preferences for information in a self-
serving way to preserve their beliefs. For example, Karlsson et al. (2009) show that, investors
monitor their portfolios frequently in rising markets, whereas they do not when the markets are
flat or falling. In bad times they “put their heads in the sand” to avoid bad news. Another example
shows that such behavior can be observed even in professional investors as a group who can be “a
color-blind in a sea of red flags” and can cause immense financial loss (Norris, y 16).1 Not only in
financial investments but also in the decisions that consumers make a similar behavior is observed.
More information in the label increases demand for eco-labeled products by compelling people to
choose these products over others (Loureiro et al., 2002). Reczek et al. (2018); Onwezen and
van der Weele (2016) show that when making consumption decisions, people ignore information
about ethically relevant products.
Even when there is no observer, people may worry about learning unpleasant things about
themselves. This concern may stem from the fact that people strive for being successful and good
people, and learning that they could not manage may be painful. Bénabou and Tirole (2003) and
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) explain this behavior with the concerns on how people think of and
see themselves—self-image. Similarly, Bodner and Prelec (2003) argue that people learn things
about themselves—get diagnosis—from their actions and decisions. They can learn how altruistic
and fair, and how skillful and intelligent they are from the decisions they make and activities
they engage in. When this diagnosis is not congruent with the existing beliefs, it may be hurtful
to learn and people may try to avoid this information by not learning their scores in tests or the
consequences of their decisions. This behavior might be caused by the uncertainty that people
feel about their own morality and abilities. Köszegi (2006) explains this with the confidence that
people have about their own beliefs: if people are confident about their inner traits and abilities,
information that contradicts those beliefs cannot change the opinions much. However, if people
1Norris’s (y 16) NYT article covers the mortgage securitization of Merrill Lynch in 2007. It was reported in 2019
that there were more than 100 “red flags”.
2 Chapter 0
Essays on Information Preferences and Morality
are not confident about their own beliefs, then information can change the existing beliefs which
could be detrimental for ego. For example, Eil and Rao (2011) show that people incur monetary
costs to avoid learning how they performed in an intelligence test and how attractive they are seen
by other people.
As it is important for people to appear skillful to others and to themselves, to pursue a
positive moral image has great importance as well. In many decision, people need to forego private
benefit to make moral decisions or to increase other’s welfare. In the previous studies, it has been
shown that in such situations people are eager to appear moral, either to others (Ariely et al.,
2009; Lacetera and Macis, 2010) or to themselves (Dana et al., 2007; Mazar et al., 2008; Falk,
2020). In such decisions, people may feel compelled to act according to moral constraints for
their desire to be regarded as good people by others and by themselves. Absence of information
about the consequences of their decisions may help to circumvent these moral constraints in such
cases. Not knowing what a decision can cause or did cause can make the selfish decisions easier
without having concerns about morality. A lot of research show that when they are in situations
in which increasing private monetary benefit is at odds with causing a loss for someone else or
making unfair decisions, people choose to opt out from information about the consequences for
others and selfishness increases substantially (Dana et al., 2007; Grossman and Van Der Weele,
2017; Broberg et al., 2007). People deliberately choose ignorance self-servingly to make selfish
decisions when faced with a moral conflict. Golman et al. (2017) provide a detailed review of
situations in which information avoidance can be chosen strategically, such as consumption and
political decisions that may potentially hurt others.
As people can actively shape their information environment, avoidance may not be the only
tool to circumvent moral constraints. People sometimes, may collect “additional” information to
excuse the selfish decisions. The demand for unnecessary information is shown in the previous
literature for a desire receive anticipated positive news about one’s own intelligence (Eliaz and
Schotter, 2010), and appetite for knowledge or a desire to close the gap between what is known and
Chapter 0 3
Essays on Information Preferences and Morality
what information is available (Golman and Loewenstein, 2018; Golman et al., 2019; Loewenstein,
1994). People may demand additional information not only to receive the anticipated utility or
pure curiosity, but also to justify morally questionable decisions, such as dishonesty.
Information is central in almost all economic and social decisions that people face since
what is known matters. For example, people need to know about their abilities when deciding
what to study or what career to choose, about the specification of products they consume and
about the consequences of their decisions for themselves and for others, and this is particularly
important when there is a potential impact on other people. This means absence of information
can contribute to the inefficiencies that are caused by the decisions that people make. People may
end up choosing the wrong education and career path, may consume products that are harmful for
themselves and for others, and may cause a loss for others as a result of their decisions. This means
investigating motivations for information preferences and the effects on individual decisions is
crucial to understand these inefficiencies. The main focus of the chapters of this thesis is the
association between information preferences and moral decisions.
In the first three chapters of this thesis, I explore how people actively shape their infor-
mation environment when they face a trade-off between their self-image and monetary gain. In
the first two chapters, the self-image is about moral relevance of decisions that can affect others
badly or might involve deception to increase private benefit. In the third chapter, self-image is in
a context in which people face a trade-off between learning how well they performed in an intel-
ligence test and monetary gains. In the fourth chapter, I report the findings of a study on social
and moral psychology during Covid-19 from an international collaboration. All chapters include
pre-registered laboratory, online or a survey experiments to investigate behavioral motivations of
individual decisions.
In the first chapter of this thesis which is titled as “Information and Strategic Avoidance in
Reciprocal Decisions”, I investigate motivations for information preferences by focusing on de-
cisions in which concerns about how others and oneself can see it—image concerns—may have
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an impact. In a reciprocal setting, I document that people avoid information even when it cannot
affect their decision. In such settings, people make decisions in response to another person’s de-
cision in a positive or a negative way, such as kindness to kindness and rudeness to anger. Not
reciprocating means betraying another person’s intentions. To investigate how information and
preferences over information can change reciprocity, I conducted a laboratory experiment with a
manipulated trust game which is played in pairs (trustors and trustees). Trustors decide whether
to send money to the trustee, and then trustees decide whether to return any to the trustor. In the
standard game, people make decisions with complete information about each other’s endowment,
whereas in the present paper, both players are not informed about the consequences of their de-
cisions in terms of final distributions. Having such a design enables me to investigate the effects
of exogenously given information and ignorance. However, trustees have the chance to acquire or
to avoid information by incurring a monetary cost. Acquiring information can help to reciprocate
more and lead to more equal distribution, whereas avoiding information can help not to feel bad
about making selfish decisions and not reciprocating.2
I aim to answer mainly two questions in this paper. The first question is: Can exogenously
provided information change reciprocal decisions? To investigate this question, trustees in one
treatment are exogenously given the information about their trustor’s initial endowment whereas
in another treatment they made their decision under ignorance. I document that exogenously given
information increases reciprocity substantially compared to uninformed decisions. The second
question is: Do individuals avoid information strategically to make selfish decisions and to pre-
serve a good image even when the decision has already been made? To answer this question,
trustees are given the chance to deliberately choose whether they want to know trustor’s endow-
ment level. I document that there is a link between information preferences and reciprocity; low
levels of reciprocity are positively correlated with information avoidance and higher levels of reci-
procity are correlated with information acquisition. This pattern is observed both before and after
2I use selfish to describe the decision that is not prosocial in the experiment.
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the reciprocal decision has been made, which suggests that even after the decision has been made,
learning that it caused selfish outcomes may make one feel bad.
This paper contributes to understanding the insights of reciprocal decisions with three main
results on the effects of exogenous information settings: the association between reciprocity and
information, and ex-ante and ex-post information preferences. The first main result is, when there
is exogenous information, average returned amounts are approximately 2 times higher than when
there is no chance to receive information ex-ante. Second, I document that information avoid-
ance is negatively related with the returned amounts and, thus, is motivated by the monetary re-
wards. People who choose to know the consequences of their decisions return significantly higher
amounts on average than people who choose to avoid information. And the third result of this
paper is, I report that even after they have already made the decision, people who choose to re-
turn lower amounts are more likely to avoid information. 60% of the people who wanted to avoid
information returned 0 to their partners. Information about the consequences, particularly in recip-
rocal decisions, does not only have an instrumental value in terms of reaching better distribution
decisions, but also a psychological value by signaling how prosocial the decision was even when
it had already been made.
The second chapter is a joint paper with two fellow PhD students at NHH, Joel W. Berge and
Katrine B. Nødvedt, and titled as “Strategic Curiosity: An Experimental Study of Curiosity and
Dishonesty”. In this study, we provide experimental evidence on a novel phenomenon concerning
information preferences: people strategically collect additional unnecessary information to justify
morally questionable decisions. We conduct a virtual dice-rolling experiment where participants
roll a dice and self-report the outcome of the first roll for monetary rewards. In this setting, we
vary the extent to which participants can continue rolling the dice before reporting as well as the
displayed content of those additional roll-outcomes. We document that people systematically roll
the dice more—are more curious—when tempted to misreport. We find that curiosity is positively
correlated with the size of the lie. However, contrary to previous studies, we observe no variation
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in dishonesty across treatments regardless of the possibility to collect additional non-instrumental
information. This study provides new insights into how individuals actively shape their informa-
tion environment in pursuit of self-interest.
In a pre-registered experiment, we recruited 1580 US participants on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (mTurk). In the base treatment (Single Roll), participants roll the dice once and then report
the outcome. In this condition, people can continue to roll the dice after reporting while knowing
that they cannot change their report. To study how people search for additional information when
tempted to misreport, we introduce three variations to identify causal effects of different informa-
tion environments. In the Three Rolls treatment, the number of rolls is limited to three, and people
do not have a chance to roll less or more than three times before reporting the outcome of the
first roll. In the other two treatments, participants can roll as many times as they want to before
reporting. In the Multiple Numbers treatment, the dice’s sides always display numbers, whereas in
the Multiple Figures treatment, the dice displays random figures after the first roll. Since only the
outcome of the first roll should be reported, additional rolls have no instrumental value in the case
of honest reporting.
Similar to avoiding information that makes it difficult to excuse selfish decisions (Grossman,
2014), we find evidence that curiosity is driven by a desire to justify selfish behavior. Our main
finding is that non-instrumental information is collected strategically, implying that people are
strategically curios. We call the behavioral phenomenon that people collect related and unrelated
additional information to relax moral constraints that are at odds with their self-interest strategic
curiosity. Contrary to the previous literature, we find no variation in dishonesty across treatments
despite the possibility to collect additional information and the content of this information. With
our explicit focus on deliberate decisions to acquire additional non-instrumental information when
tempted to misreport, we contribute to the research on information and moral decisions by showing
that curiosity can also be driven by a desire to justify selfish behavior.
Our results provide evidence that people are systematically more curious when collecting
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additional information can help justify dishonesty. As this is an observed game, we can disentan-
gle whether collecting additional information that is related or unrelated to the outcome leads to
higher misreporting. We find that people who observe lower outcomes in the first roll are more
likely to roll more times before reporting the outcome of the first roll. This result indicates that
people acquire additional information—not only to search for justifications—but also to distract
themselves from moral conflict.
This study contributes to research on preferences toward information in moral dilemmas,
which can arise both before and after a decision has been made, and both when the decision-maker
possesses incomplete and full information. Various motivations that shape information preferences
have been documented previously, and curiosity is one of the prominent drivers of information
acquisition. Loewenstein (1994) provides a review on curiosity and posits that demand for infor-
mation is intrinsic; it is “appetite for knowledge." This kind of curiosity directed toward all kinds
of information is defined as epistemic curiosity (Litman et al., 2005). We find that curiosity need
not only arise from an intrinsic desire for information; it might also be driven by a strategic de-
sire to justify selfish behavior or distract oneself from moral conflict. More recently, Golman and
Loewenstein (2018) introduce the concept of “information gaps", which refers to people’s desire
to collect information to close the gaps between what is already known and what information is
available. Eliaz and Schotter (2010) provide experimental evidence that individuals are willing to
pay to receive information regarding the results of an intelligence test even when this informa-
tion has no value in terms of achieving higher outcomes. We find that people acquire unnecessary
information particularly when tempted to make morally questionable decisions. This extends the
literature on curiosity by showing that curiosity may be motivated by strategic reasons rather than
only an innocuous desire to collect information.
The third chapter is in collaboration with a fellow PhD student, Stefan Meißner and titled
as “Investigating Motivations for Information Avoidance—The Role of Certainty, Rewards and
Overconfidence”. In this paper we investigate an objective for active information avoidance: self-
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image protection. In two experiments, we study how information preferences can change when the
information is ego related and hurtful for self-image, and when it is neutral. To vary the neutrality
of information, in the first experiment we use information about one’s relative rank in an intel-
ligence test and in the second experiment we use “neutral” information that is about a randomly
chosen number. Our results show that people avoid ego related information and are willing to pay
to do so, however, this behavior is not related with confidence and certainty about beliefs in one’s
own skills. We observe that a high share of people avoid “neutral” information even though it is
not ego-related, and the willingness to pay to do so is positive. Besides avoidance, we provide
findings that show people’s willingness to pay to receive neutral information respond to the value
of information. In the first experiment, we only use ego utility and the information is about relative
rank in an intelligence test. We find high willingness to pay for both information and avoidance,
which did not clarify the motivations for information avoidance. To test whether ego related infor-
mation is the reason for high avoidance, we ran the second experiment a year after the first one,
with using only neutral information. In the second experiment, the neutral information is about
a randomly chosen number which is not related to the intelligence level or any personal attribu-
tion. We observe that a high share of participants avoid information even though the information
cannot show anything about their abilities. When we compare the amounts people are willing to
pay in these two experiments, we find that demand for avoidance from ego related information is
significantly higher compared to avoidance from neutral information. In this paper, we show that
when making decisions on information, people may have behavioral noise which affects the mea-
sures of our treatments. However, by comparing two kinds of information we show that despite
the behavioral noise they may have, people are willing to pay higher amounts to avoid ego related
information. Our findings contributes to the literature on information and ego utility by showing
that these preferences might not be driven solely by self-image concerns.
The last chapter of the thesis is titled as “National identity predicts public health support
during a global pandemic: Results from 67 nations”. This paper is a result of an international
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collaboration of more than 150 researchers from 67 countries, to investigate moral and social
psychology during Covid-19. In the last year of my PhD, the Covid-19 pandemic has caused
devastating disruptions in economic and social systems all over the world. Millions of people
lost their health and even lives, and many others fall into extreme poverty. In the mean time,
public health policies differed in every country, and thus, the influence of the pandemic was varied.
Understanding how the pandemic will affect individual behavior and the aggregate systems is
crucial to be able to evaluate policies and regulations and their future effects. I decided to join
this research collaboration in the late stages of my PhD to contribute the behavioral research on
the Covid-19 pandemic. The paper in this chapter is the first paper of this project investigating
support for public health and its psychological determinants. As of January 2021, more than 90
million people worldwide have been infected by the new coronavirus and more than 1.9 million
have died, making the COVID-19 pandemic one of the greatest health crises of the last 100 years.
Until a vaccine or effective medical treatment is developed, the public response to the current
pandemic is largely limited to policy-making and collective behavior change (Lewnard and Lo,
2020). To reduce virus transmission, it is crucial that people engage in public health behavior
(e.g., maintain spatial distance and improve physical hygiene) and support COVID-19 protective
policies (e.g., limiting travel and closing bars and restaurants). Indeed, the Director of the World
Health Organization recently argued: “That is why behavioural science is so important—it helps
us to understand how people make decisions, so we can support them to make the best decisions
for their health” (WHO, 2020). In the current investigation, we respond to this call for behavioral
science and present the results from a global study across 67 countries, testing key predictors of
public health support.
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Chapter 1
Information and Strategic Avoidance in
Reciprocal Decisions
Abstract
People sometimes avoid information about the consequences of a decision for other people, when
it can signal an undesired characteristic about themselves such as being selfish or untrustworthy.
Even when the only observer is themselves, people can have self-image concerns. This paper
contributes to the literature on information preferences and moral decisions by showing the relation
between self-image concerns and information preferences in a reciprocal setting. In a laboratory
experiment with 520 participants, I show that when information is exogenously given, reciprocity
is higher compared to the setting in which information is hidden. People who reciprocate less are
more likely to avoid information about the consequences of their decisions for their partner. This
behavior is present even when the reciprocal decision has already been made and the information
0This work is partially supported by the Research Council of Norway through its Centres of Excellence Scheme,
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Sørensen, Sigve Tjøtta, Bertil Tungodden and the participants of PhD Workshop at Norwegian School of Economics and
University of Bergen, Brown Bag Seminar at Department of Economics - FAIR at the Norwegian School of Economics,
Brown Bag Seminar at the Department of Economics at Brown University, BBE Workhsop at Humboldt University,
ESA Job Market Candidate Seminars and Nordic Exchange seminar at Lund University for their helpful comments and
contributions. I thank to M. Yiğit Gürdal at Boğaziçi University for making it possible to run the experiment at the
Boğaziçi Econ Lab. I would like to thank Centre of Ethics at the Norwegian School of Economics for financial support.
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cannot affect the allocation. Overall, the findings show reciprocal decisions are not only motivated
by the desire for fair outcomes or being seen as a good person by others, but also the desire to self
identify as a good person.
Keywords: Information avoidance; self-image; reciprocity
JEL-Classifications: C91, D82, D83, D91
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1.1 Introduction
People often make decisions in which increasing one’s own benefit means causing a loss for others.
In such situations, morality is often considered as the prominent obstacle to make the decision that
serves one’s own benefit. Evidence from experiments shows that avoiding information about the
consequences of a decision for others can reduce these constraints from morality (Dana et al.,
2006, 2007; Grossman and Van Der Weele, 2017). There is also evidence from the field: more
information in the label increases demand for eco-labeled products by compelling people to choose
these products over others (Loureiro et al., 2002). Reczek et al. (2018); Onwezen and van der
Weele (2016) show that when making consumption decisions, people ignore information about
ethically relevant products. People can choose what information to collect not to feel bad about the
decision or to be regarded as a prosocial person by both oneself and others. Economic models often
assume that avoidance is a strategy only in the ex-ante perspective—prior to decision making—
when the information about consequences can influence the decision and make one feel compelled
to act in a certain way. That means, there is no need to avoid information to preserve a desired
image if the decision has already been made and and changing it upon receiving the information
is not an option, or in other words when information is not instrumental in decision making. This
argument contradicts with people having concerns about past decisions for causing a bad outcome
for others such as guilt and regret, and does not explain how preferences over information could
change when these concerns are present.
This paper experimentally investigates motivations for information preferences by focusing
on decisions in which concerns about how others and oneself can see it—image concerns—may
have an impact. In a reciprocal setting, I document that people avoid information even when it is
not instrumental. In such settings, people make decisions in response to another person’s decision
in a positive or a negative way, such as kindness to kindness and rudeness to anger. Not reciprocat-
ing means betraying another person’s intentions. To investigate how information and preferences
over information can change reciprocity, I conducted a laboratory experiment with a manipulated
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trust game which is played in pairs (trustors and trustees). Trustors decide whether to send money
to the trustee, and then trustees decide whether to return any to the trustor. In the standard game,
people make decisions with complete information about each other’s endowment, whereas in the
present paper, both players are not informed about the consequences of their decisions in terms
of final distributions. Having such a design enables me to investigate the effects of exogenously
given information and ignorance. However, trustees have the chance to acquire or to avoid infor-
mation by incurring a monetary cost. Acquiring information can help to reciprocate more and lead
to more equal distribution, whereas avoiding information can help not to feel bad about making
selfish decisions and not reciprocating.1
The relation between information and image concerns has been a topic in both theoretical
and experimental literature. Bodner and Prelec (2003) defines diagnostic utility of a decision as
the diagnosis a decision can signal about one’s own inner traits and characteristics. Bénabou and
Tirole’s (2006) theory focuses on the role of diagnostic utility by proposing a framework with a
decision maker and an observer. Bénabou and Tirole (2006) argue that people care how they are
seen by the observer which could be others (social image) and by themselves (self image) when
making a decision. Grossman and Van Der Weele (2017) extend these two models to explain the
relation between self-image concerns and information preferences in a self signalling model in
which the observer is oneself and the decision introduces a conflict between a self serving choice
and welfare. Their model concludes that information avoidance is an opt out mechanism only when
information can be used to make better decisions in terms of welfare and when some people are
tempted to choose the self serving option. Evidence from experiments has shown similar behavior
when people are tempted to make selfish decisions or when information is potentially bad news
about one’s health or intelligence (Eil and Rao, 2011; Ganguly and Tasoff, 2017). Related literature
established various motivations for information avoidance such as procrastination, anticipatory
utility, guilt aversion and political concerns (Grossman and Van Der Weele, 2017; Attanasi et al.,
1I use selfish to describe the decision that is not prosocial in the experiment.
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2015; Golman et al., 2017; Köszegi, 2006). In addition to the experimental evidence, information
avoidance is documented in various field settings. Ehrich and Irwin (2005) and Reczek et al. (2018)
show that people are reluctant to get ethical information on cheap products and are more likely to
remember good information about well working products. It is yet unclear how exogenously given
(or not given) information can affect how much people reciprocate and whether people avoid
information to prevent feelings of letting someone down and not reciprocating positive intentions
even after they have already made the decision and information has no instrumental value.
To fill this gap in the literature I aim to answer mainly two questions in this paper. The first
question is: Can exogenously provided information change reciprocal decisions? To investigate
this question, trustees in one treatment are exogenously given the information about their trustor’s
initial endowment whereas in another treatment they made their decision under ignorance. I doc-
ument that exogenously given information increases reciprocity substantially compared to unin-
formed decisions.
The second question is: Do individuals avoid information strategically to make selfish deci-
sions and to preserve a good image even when the decision has already been made? To answer this
question, trustees are given the chance to deliberately choose whether they want to know trustor’s
endowment level. I document that there is a link between information preferences and reciprocity;
low levels of reciprocity are positively correlated with information avoidance and higher levels of
reciprocity are correlated with information acquisition. This pattern is observed both before and
after the reciprocal decision has been made, which suggests that even after the decision has been
made, learning that it caused selfish outcomes may make one feel bad.
The present paper contributes to the recently growing literature on information preferences
and moral decisions by providing evidence that what motivates moral decisions may not only be
the desire for fair outcomes but also what these decisions signal about one’s own characteristics to
oneself and to others. Results show that lack of information can create a moral wiggle room which
circumvents reciprocity and makes selfish decisions easier. Similar findings have been documented
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in non-reciprocal settings (Dana et al., 2007; Grossman and Van Der Weele, 2017; Golman et al.,
2017).
A total of 520 undergraduate students were recruited to participate in the experiment. To
have uncertainty about the final distribution after the trustee choose how much to return, the en-
dowment levels are heterogenous—low (15 ECU) or high (35 ECU). Each player is assigned to
one of the two endowment levels randomly and are not informed about each other’s endowments.
The trustees can choose to receive or to avoid this information by incurring a monetary cost, re-
vealing their willingness to pay to receive, and to avoid information (WTP, henceforth). I vary the
timing of this decision to investigate information preferences before (ex-ante) and after (ex-post)
deciding how much to return.
This paper contributes to understanding the insights of reciprocal decisions with three main
results on the effects of exogenous information settings: the association between reciprocity and
information, and ex-ante and ex-post information preferences. When there is exogenous informa-
tion, average returned amounts are approximately 2 times higher than when there is no chance to
receive information ex-ante. I document that information avoidance is negatively related with the
returned amounts and, thus, is motivated by the monetary rewards. People, who choose to know
the consequences of their decisions return significantly higher amounts on average than people
who choose to avoid information. One of the most important contributions I make with this paper
is to show that even after they have already made the decision, people who choose to return lower
amounts are more likely to avoid information. 60% of the people who wanted to avoid informa-
tion returned 0 to their partners. Information about the consequences, particularly in reciprocal
decisions, does not only have an instrumental value in terms of reaching better distribution deci-
sions, but also a psychological value by signaling how prosocial the decision was even when it had
already been made.
Most of the experimental evidence on information preferences and moral decisions are doc-
umented from dictator games. In dictator games, a sender is asked to decide how much to share
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over a given endowment with a passive recipient. Even though dictator games provide a very sim-
ple and abstract setup to investigate prosociality, a decision maker in the game is less socially
entangled than in many real life decisions. In addition, in dictator games, on the one hand, players
only have information from the experimenter and the resources could be considered as “manna
from heaven”. Trust games, on the other hand, provide a setup in which the decision maker receives
a signal from the partner about their intentions and the decision is entangled with reciprocity. Re-
ciprocal decisions can provide a more realistic setup by introducing the behavioral signal from the
trustor’s sending decision which creates a social pressure. Although dictator games are commonly
used in the behavioral research and are abstract forms of many social decisions, when the decisions
are under greater social pressure, people can avoid information to preserve a good self-image even
when the decision has already been made and cannot be changed.
Reciprocal decisions give the chance to respond to someone else’s behavior in a positive or
a negative way and are often considered as measures of trust and trustworthiness. When making
decisions that affect others, intentions and beliefs play an important role. Arrow (1974) describes
trust as “an important lubricant of a social system”. Even though it cannot be easily valued in mon-
etary terms, trust and trustworthiness have a pragmatic value in relations with other individuals and
institutions by decreasing inefficiencies. With Arrow’s (1974) words, “It is extremely efficient; it
saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on the other people’s word”. With advanc-
ing technology and numerous devices, information is easily accessible and individuals are able
to choose what to know and what not to. It is important to investigate the role of information in
decision making to better understand dynamics of morality.
In classical economic theory, almost all models assume people pursue their material benefit
when making decisions. However, evidence shows that individuals act according to their con-
cerns for fairness and inequality when faced with a conflict between moral values and self-serving
opportunities. This inconsistency between classical theory and evidence shows that classical eco-
nomic theories lack psychological realism. Behavioral models incorporate psychological motiva-
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tions such as fairness motives and concerns about inequality into individual utility, which incorpo-
rates psychological realism in economic theories. Outcome based models, propose that concerns
about inequality motivate altruistic behavior (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000). Cappelen et al. (2007) show that fairness ideals could vary and lead people to make dif-
ferent distribution decisions. These models suggest that individuals suffer from unfair outcomes
and this affects how they decide to distribute an amount of money between themselves and others.
Outcome based models provide explanations on motivations for distributive decisions, however,
they do not explain how concerns about one’s image and information can change these decisions.
Questions on how information about the consequences of a decision could affect “perception of
oneself”, self image, remain unanswered in outcome-based models. By providing evidence on the
relation between selfish decisions and information avoidance, I show that self-image concerns may
play an important role for reciprocal decisions and choices toward information may be shaped
by these concerns. This finding does not support the classical theory of information economics
which considers information as a desirable asset only in the ex-ante perspective when it can help
to make superior decisions both for individual utility and social welfare (Stigler, 1961). How-
ever, it supports more recent theories that introduce information as a direct source of utility—or
disutility—by signalling one’s own characteristics and dispositions to oneself and to others, rather
than being only a tool (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Bénabou and Tirole,
2004, 2011). Following this, findings of the present paper also support the argument that when
there is a potentially bad signal, it can be painful for people to learn that they are not in the de-
sired good profile and can avoid information even when there is no one else observing (Grossman
and Van Der Weele, 2017). Besides this support, I extend Grossman and Van Der Weele’s (2017)
predictions and findings on information avoidance by showing that in a more complex moral set-
ting, people avoid information ex-post and are willing to incur a monetary cost not to learn the
consequences of their decisions.
Grossman and Van Der Weele’s (2017) model introduces a trade-off between self image and
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self interested choices. They investigate situations in which the information is about the welfare
effects of the decision. They argue that knowing the welfare effects of a decision may make one
feel compelled to act less selfishly. Avoiding ex-ante information about the consequences of the
decision helps to protect the self-image and prevent feeling bad about causing a loss for some-
one else. In their model, people should avoid information only in the ex-ante perspective when
information can potentially change the decision. Because in that case, making the selfish decision
while knowing the consequences can cause the decision maker to act in a certain way. They argue
that higher willingness to be perceived in a desired way increases willingness to avoid information
for individuals who are tempted to act selfishly.2 I present results that support and extend Gross-
man and Van Der Weele’s (2017) argument by showing that in reciprocal decisions information
avoidance can be chosen to make more selfish decisions. I also show that in trust games, image
concerns are more important than in dictator games and people avoid information even when there
is no instrumental value of information.
In the next section, the design of the experiment is explained in detail. The rest of the
paper is as follows: The third section documents the procedure and the details of the sample, the
fourth section discusses the results and the fifth section concludes the paper by discussing the
implications of the findings. In the appendices, details of the post-experiment questionnaire and
supplementary analysis can be found.
1.2 Experimental Design
The general setup of this experiment includes variations of the standard trust game (Berg et al.,
1995) to investigate information preferences in reciprocal decisions when participants face a con-
flict between monetary gain and moral constraints. The standard trust game (investment game, lost
wallet) is a sequential game played in pairs. Players are assigned to roles of trustors and trustees
2In Grossman and Van Der Weele (2017) homo economicus types in the model are the extreme selfish types and are
assumed to make preferences to only increase monetary payoffs. These people are assumed to have no concerns about
their image. High social types, on the other hand, always make the welfare increasing decisions and always acquire
information to reach superior decisions in terms of final distributions.
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and the trustor decides whether to send a part of her initial endowment (if any) to the trustee. If the
trustor decides to send, this amount is multiplied by three and transferred to the trustee. The trustee
then decides how much to return out of the total amount he received (see Figure 1.1). In the stan-
dard trust game, both trustor and trustee make decisions with complete information about the rules
and the endowments of both parties. This means when deciding whether to send and how much
to return, players are able to calculate final distributions and make their decisions accordingly. By
sending money to the trustee, trustors signal intentions and trust and reciprocity expectations to
trustees. Trustees can choose whether to reciprocate or not, which is the main moral dilemma in
the game. Although returned amounts vary under different settings, Johnson and Mislin (2011)
report that the average returned amount is 37% of the total received amount. Variations in the re-
turned amount when the endowment levels are different are attributed to inequality aversion. This
means, people respond to unequal endowments in the standard trust game. By adding uncertainty
on the initial levels of endowments, this paper investigates how information preferences can serve
to circumvent the moral constraints in the trust game.
The design is mainly built on two manipulations of the standard trust game: participants’
initial endowment levels are not unified and they do not have complete information on each other’s
endowment. Information is disclosed if the trustee decides to do so and two timings are introduced
for this decision: before the returning decision is made ex-ante and after the decision is made
ex-post.
At the beginning of the experiment participants are randomly paired and assigned to the
roles of trustors and trustees and one of the two endowment levels, high (35 ECU) or low (15
ECU). Assignment to endowment levels are randomized on the participant level and participants
are informed that each of them is assigned to one of the endowment levels with equal chance.
When the game starts, participants learn their role and endowment level but not their partner’s
endowment level. For trustors, instructions and rules are the same in all treatments. They are
informed that they do not have the chance to learn their trustee’s endowment and information
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preferences in any stage of the experiment. After learning their role and endowment, the trustors
are asked to decide whether to send 10 ECU or not. The trustor’s choice is a binary choice; they
can send 10 ECU or 0 ECU. If the trustor decides to send, 10 ECU is multiplied by 3 and 30 ECU
is received by the trustee. Trustors who chose not to send and their trustees are directed to another
screen in which they answer unincentivized questions and received a participation fee at the end.
The complete ignorance in trustors’ decisions, provides a chance to investigate the motivations
of trust. Since 10 ECU is lower than both of the potential endowment levels, it is not possible
for trustees to make any assumptions about the trustor’s endowment level. Thus, the trustors’
sending decision signals nothing but trust to the trustees. After the trustors’ decision, the trustees
are assigned one of the three treatments and asked to decide how much to return. Because the
endowments are heterogeneous in the game, making a decision to reach equal final distributions
requires the trustees to know the trustor’s initial endowment (for an overview of endowment levels
and equalizing returns see Figure 1.2).
In the Hidden Information treatment, trustees are given the chance to decide whether to
acquire information about their partner’s endowment level or not ex-ante, and they are informed









e1   x+ y
e2 + 3x  y
Figure 1.1: Trust Game
Note: In the ordinary trust game, trustor starts the game with e1 endowment level and trustee) starts with
e2. First, trustor decides how much to send to trustee, 0 or x. If trustor decides not to send anything both
players end up with their initial endowments: e1 and e2. If trustor decides to send x, it is multiplied by 3 and
sent to trustee as 3x. Then in the second stage, trustee decides how much to return to trustor between 0 and
3x. If trustee decides to send y, trustor will receive y have a final payoff of e1  x+y and trustee will have a
final payoff as e2 +3x  y.
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the default option is not to acquire the information and it is costless.
In the Ex-Ante Avoidance treatment, similar to the Hidden Information treatment, trustees
decide whether to acquire the information ex-ante. In this treatment, trustees are informed that they
incur a monetary cost if they decide to avoid information. In this treatment, the default is to acquire
the information and it is costless. In both the Hidden Information and the Ex-Ante Avoidance
treatments, trustees decide whether to get the information about the trustors’ endowment (I = 1)
or not (I = 0) before deciding how much to return.
In the Ex-Post Avoidance treatment, trustees decide how much to return under ignorance,
and then they are asked to decide whether to acquire information on the final distribution or not
(ex-post). In this treatment, the default is to acquire the information and it is costless. In Ex-
Post Avoidance, participants make the information decision after they decide how much to return
without knowing the trustor’s endowment. After the decision has been made and the information
preferences are stated, a revision screen, which participants were not informed about in advance,
pops up for the ones who receive information (for those both who choose to acquire information
and who want to avoid but lost the auction). The possibility of revising the returned amount is
introduced to investigate the effects of unwanted information.
In all treatments, the trustees’ conditional returning amounts for the possible endowment
levels of the trustors are elicited by using the strategy method. If they receive the information (if
they win the auction in Hidden Information and lose in other treatments), the decision for the re-
alized condition is implemented and they are informed about it (see Figure 1.3 for the timing of
the game). If they do not receive the information, they are asked to decide another unconditional
amount to return which is to be implemented for any endowment level of the trustor. Formulating
the returning decision in this way gives the chance to collect informed and uninformed decisions in
all treatments. Ex-Post Avoidance treatment enables me to collect revision decisions after they sub-
mit amounts that they want to return unconditionally. This gives the chance to investigate whether
receiving information which they wanted to avoid has any effect on return (revised) decisions.
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Introducing two different time settings for information preferences helps to investigate
whether the motivation for the preference is use of information for the decision or potential psy-
chological loss of learning one’s own type. On the one hand, in both Hidden Information and
Ex-Ante Avoidance treatments, information has instrumental value in the classical terms since it
can be used for deciding how much to return. It can help to make superior decisions in terms of
final distribution for both players and social welfare. On the other hand, without information the
feeling of being compelled to act prosocially decreases and selfish actions can be justified by not
being aware of the consequences. This impact of information is predicted by Grossman and Van
Der Weele (2017). In Ex-Post Avoidance, trustees make the returning decision under ignorance
and then state their preference on information. Thus, information has no instrumental value since
the return decision had already made. However, it can still have a psychological impact on image
utility and ignorance can be preferred strategically to protect self-image. Avoiding information
about the consequences for the other party helps trustees to maintain a desired self-image. In the
ex-post setting, information has a diagnostic value by showing one’s own prosociality rather than
an instrumental value as argued by Bodner and Prelec (2003) and Bénabou and Tirole (2011).
In all three treatments, trustees’ WTP for information preferences (avoidance or acquisition)




















Figure 1.2: Returning Decision in the game
Note: After Player 1’s decision, Player 2 can cooperate and return a part of the investment or defect and take
all the investment for herself. Depending on E1 and E2, the equalizing amount of return differs as shown in
parentheses.
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true WTPs, a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auction is used (Becker et al., 1964; Broberg
et al., 2007). After stating their preferences on acquiring the information or avoiding the informa-
tion, in a separate screen trustees are asked to state the price that they are willing to pay for that
decision to be implemented over 1 ECU bonus. A randomly chosen price is compared with the
player’s willingness to pay. When the auction resolves, the randomly chosen price is announced to
the trustees. If the participant’s WTP is greater than the randomly chosen price, the decision is im-
plemented and he pays the game price and the rest of 1 ECU bonus is added to the final payoff. If a
participant’s WTP is lower, the decision is not implemented and he does not pay anything so the 1
ECU bonus is added to the final payoff.3 For those who do not want to change the default setting,
I impute WTP of zero. Bids in the BDM auction gives a continuous measure of WTP to acquire /
avoid information for each person. At the end of the experiment, final payoffs are realized and the
post experiment questionnaire takes place. In this experiment, each person makes a single decision
(sending or returning) to prevent priming effects which could emerge when multiple decisions are
made by the same person.
The design that is explained above helps to answer the main questions of the study. By
assigning participants to default information and ignorance, this experiment yields results on the
effects of exogenous information in reciprocal decisions. Introducing two different time settings in
which WTP is elicited for the information avoidance to be implemented provides documentation
on information preferences and motivations for these preferences. Strategic ignorance is motivated
by image concerns; learning the consequences makes the selfish option less desirable since it has
negative signals about ones own characteristics. Bénabou and Tirole (2006, 2011) show that image
concerns as a component of the individual utility function effects social decisions when there is
an observer. This observer of the action is not necessarily another person, but oneself can observe
the consequences and learn about own inner dispositions and traits. In the previous literature it
3At the time of the experiment, the monetary equivalent of 1 ECU is 1 TRY and a soft drink at the school cafeteria
like tea, coffee or 2 bottles of water. To find an optimal bonus for BDM, participants’ opinions in a discussion after the
pilot session are taken into account.
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has been well documented that ex-ante excuses might increase selfish behavior and decreases
prosocial behavior substantially (Grossman and Van Der Weele, 2017; Dana et al., 2006, 2007;
Regner, 2016; Broberg et al., 2007). Yet it is still not very clear whether the motivation is to
prevent being compelled to act in a certain way, or to prevent receiving the negative signals that
may potentially hurt self image. If the main motivation is to prevent being compelled in a certain
way, in the Ex-Post Avoidance treatment information avoidance should not be observed since it has
no instrumental value, but if it is to avoid the negative signals, then learning about consequences
might still yield diagnostic utility and signal one’s own characteristics. Comparison of ex-ante
and ex-post ignorance enables me to pin down whether it is the instrumental value or the ex post
diagnostic utility that is important.
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Figure 1.3: Experimental Design
Note: In all groups the endowments are assigned randomly. First, the trustor makes a decision on how much to send(x). This amount is
tripled by the experimenter(3*x). The trustee decides how much money to return (and so keep) out of 3x. In the Hidden Info and Ex-ante
Information treatments trustees decide whether to receive the information before deciding how much to return. In the Ex-Post Avoidance
treatment, trustees make the decision on reciving information after they decide how much to return. A BDM auction is conducted to
receive/avoid the information in all treatments. If the auction is lost, players’ decision on revealing information won’t be implemented.
Note that if the trustor chooses not to send, both parties end up with initial endowments without proceeding the game.
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1.3 Sample and Procedure
The experiment was designed by using Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in Boğaziçi
University—İstanbul. 520 undergraduate students were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Av-
erage payments were 40 Turkish Liras which is equal to 8.6 Euros at the time of the experiment. A
pre-analysis plan was submitted before the data collection with the number "AEARCTR-000279".
The pre-analysis plan for sample size was 450 participants. The data are collected between April
2018 and October 2018. Assignment to treatments is randomized within each session. Details
about the sample can be seen in Table 1.1. 60% of the trustors decided to send 10 ECU which
supports the sample size estimation for 0.8 power in the pre-analysis plan.4 For both endowment
levels of trustors this fraction was almost the same. 61% of the participants were male and the
average age was 21. Assignment to treatments was well balanced in terms of observable charac-
teristics. Besides the behavioral measures, unincentivized decisions of trustors and trustees (who
did not receive any amount from their partner) on how much to return and send were collected
by using the strategy method. Questions on demographic information, behavioral covariates and
social preferences such as reciprocity and risk preferences were included in the post-experiment
questionnaire. Social and risk preferences were measured using questions from Falk et al.’s (2016)
preference survey module.5
1.4 Results
To investigate motivations for the choices over information, I focus on trustees’ decisions in this
section. Only a subset of the pre-registered hypotheses are analyzed and discussed in this section.6
I present results in four steps: first, the effects of exogenously given information on reciprocity, sec-
ond, information preferences and WTP for these, third, motivations for information preferences,
4Sample size estimations were made by using the findings from Johnson and Mislin’s (2011) meta-study on trust
games. The main aim was to reach a sample size to have significant variation in returned amounts between treatments.
5Details about the questionnaire can be found in the Appendix.
6I report the results for the rest of the pre-registered hypotheses and some exploratory analyses for the trustors’
sending decision in Appendix A.
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and fourth the effects of ex-post unwanted information on revised final distributions. I discuss each
result and the relation to previous literature at the end.
1.4.1 Information and Ignorance
In the Hidden Information and Ex-Ante Ignorance treatments, participants are asked to chose
whether they want to be informed prior to deciding how much to return. In the Ex-Post treatment,
participants decide how much to return without any information. In the Hidden Information and
Ex-Ante Avoidance treatments, trustees first decide how much they would return conditioned on
the levels of initial endowment and are told that in case of receiving information, this conditional
decision will be implemented, whereas if they do not receive the information, they are asked to
state how much they want to return regardless of the trustor’s initial endowment. This structure of
the design provides the opportunity to compare the exogenously given ignorance in the Ex-Post
condition with the conditionally decided return amounts in the Hidden Information and Ex-Ante
Avoidance.
Results show significant impact of ignorance on returned amounts across treatments. To test
Table 1.1: Summary descriptives by treatment
Ex-Ante Ex-Post Hidden Info
N=178 N=164 N=178
Age 20.8 (4.45) 21.1 (4.00) 20.5 (5.25)
Gender:
F 65 (36.5%) 59 (36.0%) 78 (43.8%)
Endowment 25.4 (10.0) 24.1 (9.99) 25.3 (10.0)
Trustors who sent(%) 0.64 0.63 0.57
Share of trustors who send by endowment level:
Endowment
35 ECU 15 ECU
Share of Senders: 73 (58.9%) 80 (58.8%)
Note: Standars errors are in parentheses. Participants are assigned randomly assigned to treatments within
each session. Almost 60% of the participants were male. “Trustors who sent” implies that on average 60%
of the trustors decided to send 10 ECU. This proportion is almost the same for both endowment levels as
can be seen in the bottom part of the table.
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whether ignorance has any impact on returned amounts, I compare the ignorant (unconditional)
returned amounts in the Ex-Post Avoidance with conditional returned amounts in the Hidden In-
formation and Ex-Ante Avoidance. Returned amounts are significantly lower under exogenous
ignorance than exogenous information. In the Ex-Ante Avoidance treatment, the average returned
amount is 10.97(sd. = 6.69) and in the Hidden Information treatment 11.30 (sd. = 7.23, p = 0.83
for Welch’s t-test for paired differences between Ex-Ante Avoidance and Hidden Information).
The average returned amount is 6.02 (sd. = 5.4) in the Ex-Post Avoidance treatment and signifi-
cantly lower than the averae returns both in Hidden Information (p < 0.001 for paired differences
between Ex-Post Avoidance and Hidden Information) and in Ex-Ante Avoidance (p < 0.001 for
paired differences between Ex-Post Avoidance and Ex-Ante Avoidance).
Conditional decisions in Ex-Ante and Hidden Information are not different in terms of tim-
ing and structure. Returned amounts in these two treatments are not significantly different. Under
exogenous ignorance, participants send lower amounts than the ones under exogenous informa-
tion.7 This result supports the proposed effects of ignorance in the previous literature, when there
is an uncertainty about the consequences of the decision, psychological cost decreases and selfish
decisions increase substantially.
Result 1 Exogenously given information increases reciprocity substantially whereas
ignorance lowers it.
Being ignorant about the consequences, can lower the psychological cost of decisions and
alleviate the feeling of being compelled to act in a certain way as estimated and shown in the
previous literature (Bénabou and Tirole, 2011; Grossman, 2014; Golman and Loewenstein, 2018;
Grossman and Van Der Weele, 2017; Dana et al., 2006, 2007). In the present experiment, partici-
pants who do not know the consequences of their decisions return lower amounts than those who
are informed ex-ante. This result supports the previous literature by showing that when there is no
7In the Ex-Ante Avoidance, informed (conditional) choices were weighted by probabilities: pYh+(1  p)Yl where
participants were informed that both endowment levels are equally likely to be assigned. In the Ex-Post Avoidance, the
default setting is ignorance and participants make an unconditional decision on how much to return.
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exogenously given information or the chance to acquire information about the consequences of a
decision, people can act selfishly without feeling bad about it. This first result shows that exoge-
nously given information increases reciprocity compared to exogenously given ignorance which
suggests that not knowing about what the decision can cause can decrease the psychological disu-
tility of the selfish decision and leads to lower returned amounts.
1.4.2 Information Acquisition and Avoidance
In this experiment, both information and ignorance requires participants to incur a monetary
cost. Besides its monetary cost, receiving information may have cognitive and psychological
costs to players since they have to process the information. Ignorance in the Hidden Information
treatment—or information in the Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Avoidance treatments—does not require
subjects to incur any monetary costs. Thus, if information has no other effect than its instrumental
use, people are expected to choose what is free in the treatments.
Before continuing with the details, the proportion of trustees who chose to acquire informa-
tion and avoid information in all treatments is around 75% and 25% respectively. In no treatments
does this share deviate significantly, which shows that exogenously given conditions of informa-
tion (exogenous information or ignorance) does not have a significant effect on the fraction of
information seekers and avoiders.
1.4.2.1 Willingness to Pay for Information and Ignorance
In the Ex-Ante Avoidance treatment, information can affect the decision and so it has instrumental
value in the view of classical theory. In the Ex-Post Avoidance, the returning decision has already
been made and information cannot affect the decision. However, if information has any psycho-
logical effect, it may persist even after the decision has already been made. In this case, avoidance
can be observed ex-post as well.
Although the proportion of evaders does not differ significantly, to investigate whether in-
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strumental value of information differs WTP to avoid information, I compare the WTPs in the
Ex-Ante Avoidance and the Ex-Post Avoidance treatments. Figure 1.4 shows that average WTP to
avoid information is 0.08 (sd. = 0.2), and is significantly lower than WTP to acquire information
which is 0.23 (sd. = 0.27, p < 0.001). This shows that people who intend to receive information
have a stronger motivation to do so. When calculating these averages, I added the WTPs for partic-
ipants who did not change the default option as 0. Average WTP to avoid information among only
those who chose to avoid in the Ex-Ante Avoidance and Ex-Post Avoidance treatments are 0.48
(sd. = 0.28) and 0.48 (sd. = 0.29) respectively. WTP for information among only those who wanted
to receive information in the Hidden Information treatment is 0.39 (sd. = 0.26) Interestingly, WTP
to avoid information does not vary significantly between Ex-ante and Ex-Post Avoidance treat-
ments (p = 0.29).
Result 2
a) People avoid ex-ante information even when it can help to make better distribu-
tion decisions in terms of reciprocity
b) People avoid ex-post information even when the distribution decision has al-





































Figure 1.4: WTP for Information and Ignorance
Note: This figure shows that willingness to pay for information is significantly higher than willingness to
pay for both ex-ante and Ex-Post Avoidance. Willingness to pay for avoidance is almost the same when it
is decided ex-ante and ex-post.
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Result 2a and 2b support the image utility argument by showing that the proportion of
evaders and willingness to pay for avoidance do not differ even after a decision has been made.
Not only when it can effect the decision but even after the decision has already been made, learning
about the consequences of one’s own actions causes information avoidance to maintain beliefs on
desired self image. Information can be used to make better decisions in terms of social welfare but
at the same time it can be strategically chosen/avoided to manage self image (Murnighan et al.,
2001).
Result 2b contradicts Grossman and Van Der Weele (2017) who predict lower WTP for
avoidance when instrumental value is lower or zero and provide evidence from a dictator game.
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) on the other hand, emphasize the image utility of signaling to the
observer—others or one’s self—even when the actions are already done. Result 2b differs from
the dictator game results that are documented in the literature (Dana et al., 2007; Grossman and
Van Der Weele, 2017) by showing that in reciprocal games, not reciprocating is more hurtful
than selfishness in dictator games since it means betraying another person’s intentions. The main
difference between these two is: if information about the consequences has more than instrumental
value in terms of image utility then ignorance can be observed even when the decision has already
been made. Results 2a and 2b show that in reciprocal decisions, the psychological effect of the
information is greater since the social setting is more complex than dictator game decisions. In
the next section, I present the mechanisms that lead to information acquisition and information
avoidance.
1.4.3 Motivations for Information Preferences
To investigate the motivations for information preferences, the relation between information pref-
erences and returned amounts are analyzed in Hidden Information and Ex-Ante Avoidance treat-
ments. In the previous literature, this behavior is predicted by the models and supported by the
experiments that individuals can choose not to learn about potential consequences and effects of
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their decision not to look selfish to themselves and to others (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Bodner
and Prelec, 2003; Grossman and Van Der Weele, 2017). Following the previous literature, in the
present experiment, participants’ information preferences are expected to be in line with their re-
turned amounts; if they chose not to learn about the consequences ex-ante, returned amounts are
expected to be lower and if they returned lower amounts they are expected to say “No” to informa-
tion ex-post. Figure 1.5 provides supporting evidence to the models of image concerns as reported
by Grossman and Van Der Weele (2017); Bénabou and Tirole (2011); Bodner and Prelec (2003):
in all treatments individuals who return lower amounts are more likely to say ’No’ to information
(Avg. Returned Amounts for “Yes”=10.3 (sd. = 7.34), for “No”= 6.87 (sd. = 7.37), p = 0.014). In
the Ex-Post treatment, 60% of participants who said “No” to information returned 0. This pattern
is in line with the idea that information avoidance is a strategic tool to cover up the psychological
cost of selfish decisions.
Even though WTP for ignorance does not differ significantly across treatments, to see
whether it is related with returned amounts, I report the difference in returning decisions of par-
ticipants who are willing to pay any positive amount to avoid information and those who are not
willing to pay at all. In Figure 1.6, the vertical axis exhibits 2 groups of WTP: equal to 0 and
greater than 0. It can be seen that participants who were willing to pay for ignorance are the ones
who returns relatively lower amounts. Particularly in the Ex-Post Avoidance treatment, the pro-
portion of 0 returns is much higher for participants who stated positive WTP for ignorance. This
suggests a pattern of behavior: people who returned or intend to return lower amounts are more
likely to avoid learning the consequences and are more willing to pay for it.
To investigate the association between information preferences and final returned amounts,
I report the results from an OLS regression in which final returned amounts are explained with
information decision (I = 0 or I = 1), willingness to pay (WTP) for information and avoidance,
if their decision was implemented (Lost Auction), initial endowment level and other control vari-
ables,
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Yi = a +b1Ii +b2WTPi +b3IfLosti +Xi + ei. (1.1)
Table 1.2 explains the returned amounts by information preferences and WTP for them. In
the table I report a significant relationship between final returned amounts and information pref-
erences, particularly in Hidden Information and Ex-Post Avoidance treatments. As can be seen,
WTP to acquire information is associated with higher reciprocity. In the Ex-Post Avoidance treat-

















Figure 1.5: Return by Information Decision
Note: This figure exhibits the returned amounts by information choices, as can be seen people who do
not want to receive information about the consequences of their decisions return lower amounts in all
treatments. The fraction of people who did not return anything back is much higher for those who say ‘No’
to information.
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ment, wanting to acquire the information (I = 1) has an increasing effect on returned amounts.
Participants who chose to acquire information reciprocate more. WTP has a positive effect both
in the Hidden Information and the Ex-Post Avoidance treatments. In the Ex-Post Avoidance treat-
ment, those who avoid information have image concerns to some extent and they are they are
the low social types (in the terminology of Grossman and Van Der Weele (2017)), they are not
completely selfish. As can be seen in the table, participants who have higher WTP to avoid infor-
mation are more likely to return higher amounts compared to ones who do not avoid information.
The coefficient of the “Lost Auction” variable in the table shows if a person’s WTP was positive
but lower than the game price, so the decision was not implemented. In the Hidden Information
















Figure 1.6: WTP for Ignorance by Returned Amounts
Note: This figure shows that players who returned lower amounts are more likely to have positive WTP for
ignorance. In Ex-Post treatment, a high proportion of participants who submitted positive WTP returned 0
before they made information decision. In Ex-Ante treatment, most of the participants with positive WTP
returned relatively lower amounts considering the equalizing amount is minimum 10 for all combinations
of endowment levels (see Figure 1.2).
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treatment it refers to the case that participants who were willing to pay positive amounts to acquire
the information, but they lost the auction so their decision was not implemented and they made the
decision under ignorance. As it can be seen from regression results in Table 1.2, this is positively
related with returned amounts in the Hidden Information treatment. The estimated coefficients in
Table 1.2 show that returned amounts are affected by information preferences and initial endow-
ments. Information preferences play an important role in the returned amounts, particularly in the
Hidden Information and Ex-Post Avoidance treatments. In the Ex-Ante Avoidance treatment, this
relation is not as strongly observed.
Table 1.2: Final Returns
Dependent variable:
Final Return
(Hidden Info) (Ex-Ante) (Ex-Post)
Receive Info. (1 or 0)  0.332 2.105 8.692⇤⇤⇤
(3.402) (2.252) (3.000)
WTP 10.954⇤⇤  3.370 15.442⇤⇤
(5.187) (6.022) (5.751)
Lost Auction 4.693⇤ 0.924  2.840
(2.703) (2.284) (1.857)
Endowment (=35) 4.042 4.708⇤⇤⇤  1.817
(2.612) (1.734) (1.754)
Gender (Male)  6.175⇤⇤  2.328 2.796
(2.962) (1.953) (1.944)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 51 57 51
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Note: Standars errors are in parentheses. This table shows OLS regression for the final returned amounts.
Each column represents a treatment and explanatory variables are the behavioral variables in the experiment
and controls are unlisted background characteristics which were collected in the post experiment survey.
WTP is willingness to pay for information decision to be implemented and it is between 0 and 1. Lost
Auction is a binary variable which equals to 1 if participant’s willingness to pay is positive and lower
than randomly chosen game price, so the auction was lost. Control variables include demographics and
post-experiment questionnaire which can be seen in Appendix B.
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Taken together, these results support the argument for social types that are defined by Gross-
man and Van Der Weele (2017): extremely selfish—homo economicus—types return 0 and do not
avoid learning the consequences, whereas low social types return slightly higher amounts and are
more willing to avoid learning the final distribution they caused. These results show a clear mo-
tivation for the choice of information: people who are willing to pay to acquire information are
high-social types and even when they cannot acquire the information, they return significantly
higher amounts compared to those who want to avoid information. These results on the relation
between choice of information and returned amounts show that information avoidance is motivated
by monetary rewards; people avoid ex-ante information to make selfish decisions.
1.4.4 Effects of Unwanted Information
In the Ex-Post Avoidance treatment, after the decision has been made and information preferences
are elicited, participants who wanted to avoid information but lost the auction or did not want
to avoid in the first place, receive the information eventually and are then given the opportunity
to revise the initially entered amounts to return. If the motivation for avoidance is not to feel
compelled to act in a certain way, seeing the consequences can lead to revision. However, once the
decision has been made, participants might not want to change the returned amounts to not lose
from their final payoff.
Results in Figure 1.7 show that participants revise and increase returned amounts if they
learn that their partner started with the low endowment level (15 ECU). Even though revisions
change the distribution, mostly they do not lead to equal final payoffs. After revisions, the gap
between the initial returned amounts and the amounts that equalize the final payoffs decreased
substantially; the decrease is 10.3 for high and 16.5 for low endowed trustors (p = 0.004). The
average revision to the low endowed trustors is 8.18 (sd. = 6.92), that is significantly higher than
the average revision to the high endowed ones which is 4.37(sd. = 5.54) (p = 0.003).
Figure 1.7 is split in panels which shows the endowment levels of trustor (that is shown
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when the information is revealed) in columns and whether the trustee lost the auction (wanted to
avoid information but could not). As can be seen in the figure, people who wanted to avoid infor-
mation but lost the auction and received the information unwillingly (the upper two panels) make
lower revisions after the information is received. On the other hand, people who wanted to receive
the information (the lower two panels) revise to a higher extent for both income levels of trustors.
The first column of this figure shows the revisions to low-endowed trustors. Revised amounts to
the low-endowed trustors are higher compared to those to the trustors with high endowment levels.
Result 4 If the auction is lost and information is unwillingly received ex-post,
people tend to revise their decision to reduce inequality. However, those who avoid
ex-post information are less likely to revise their initial returned amounts compared
to those who wanted to receive it.
In the revision decisions, information gains an instrumental value when people can use it






















Figure 1.7: Conditional Revisions
Note: This figure shows revisions of participants who lost and did not lose but preferred to get the infor-
mation. Participants who submitted positive amounts to avoid but could not win the auction revise lower
amounts compare to those who wanted to get information. However, revised amounts are higher when the
trustor had low endowment (15) compared to revision to trustors with high endowment (35).
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people; if they intend to make selfish decisions, ex-post information has a smaller effect compared
to those who are willing to acquire ex-post information. Although on average revisions are made
to reduce inequality, those that avoided information are less likely to make revisions, and instead
they keep their initial decisions (which on average are less reciprocal and quite selfish). Non-
revising behavior of those who want to avoid information may be driven by the objective that they
wanted to receive the amount they stated in the first place and this desire is stronger than guilt or
regret induced by the information. This result contradicts Grossman and Van Der Weele (2017) by
showing that people avoid information even when it is not instrumental and this behavior is related
to lower reciprocity. This introduces a new mechanism for information avoidance in reciprocal
decisions: people can avoid information about past decisions even when the decision was made
under ignorance. All results together, provide evidence for the effects of information on one’s self
image; knowing that the past decision caused less reciprocal distributions and let someone down
by not reciprocating their trust is something people would like to avoid, can motivate them to incur
a monetary cost to avoid this information.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
In today’s world, information is very easy to reach and is sometimes imposed on people even when
it is not asked for. This gives a new direction to behavioral studies: how do people attempt to con-
trol the flow of information that they are exposed to? For decades, effects of different levels and
asymmetry of information have been discussed and many economic and social inefficiencies are
considered to be related to problems regarding information. For example, misreporting is assumed
to occur when one has private information and can misuse it, and in the principle-agent frame-
works, principals may receive false signals about agents which can cause suboptimal outcomes.
Many economic models incorporate morality as a factor preventing people from engaging in these
inefficiencies. In the present paper I show that by avoiding information about consequences, people
can circumvent moral constraints. I provide evidence for the relation between preferences about
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information and the change in moral decisions by documenting results from a reciprocal game.
The reciprocal setting in this experiment is a rich moral environment, as it introduces the
chance to respond to someone else’s behavior. In many economic theories, reciprocity is consid-
ered mainly in forms of distribution and intentions (Sobel, 2005). When making decisions in such
settings, having equal payoffs often requires an individual to forego self utility which creates a
trade-off between moral values and opportunities. Since this mechanism is relevant to many social
interactions, reciprocity is assumed as a key concept in forming social capital (Glaeser et al., 2000),
and has fundamental implications in many economic settings (Bartling et al., 2018; Bohnet and
Huck, 2004; Berg et al., 1995). I use a reciprocal setting to investigate the effects of information
and choices over information on reciprocity. I show that when information about the consequences
of a decision for another person is exogenously given, people make less selfish choices. This re-
sult shows the importance of information in reciprocal decisions that people face in many different
contexts.
One of the underlying mechanisms that may influence the information choice and distribu-
tion decision is the concerns about inequality. Some research is devoted to investigating inequality
aversion in reciprocal decisions by using trust games. Glaeser et al. (2000) show that trustors with
lower endowments are less likely to send a part of their endowments and interpret this as an in-
dication for reciprocity expectation from trustees. Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) provide supporting
evidence from a trust game in which endowments are heterogeneous, participants with high en-
dowment level return higher amounts. Rodriguez-Lara’s (2018) results, in contrast to Xiao and
Bicchieri (2010), show that inequality aversion is not very effective in a trust game with endow-
ment heterogeneity. Different than Xiao and Bicchieri (2010), Rodriguez-Lara (2018) uses a within
subject design to allow seeing the difference between two endowment levels, which may create
experimenter demand effects on the decisions. Lower effects of inequality aversion are observed
particularly when inequality aversion is introduced in a trade off between efficiency (Kritikos and
Bolle, 2001; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) or altruism (Chowdhury and Jeon, 2014). I use an
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experiment in which opting-out from information about the consequences may cause inequal dis-
tribution of final outcomes. I show that when people face information unwillingly, they revise
their initial decisions on how much to return for achieving a more equal distribution at the end.
This behavior is particularly strong when they learn that their partner started with the low endow-
ment level. This result supports the argument that people may have concerns about inequality in
terms of reciprocating to a previous decision in reciprocal decisions (Glaeser et al., 2000; Xiao
and Bicchieri, 2010).
In this paper, I show that when people are given the chance to avoid information about the
consequences, reciprocity decreases substantially whereas when the information is exogenously
given or self-selected, reciprocity is higher and leads to less inequality in the final distribution of
outcomes. These results help understanding the dynamics of distribution decisions in trust games
by introducing the role of information and information choice for inequality aversion. This paper
documents a clear behavioral pattern between information avoidance and selfish decisions. An
important contribution of this paper is the finding that in reciprocal settings, ex-ante and ex-post
avoidance do not differ significantly. This shows that, in the reciprocal decisions, psychological
effect of information about consequences is greater, it brings a disutility to the acquirer even after
a decision has already been made and information has no instrumental value. These results extend
the Grossman and Van Der Weele’s (2017) predictions on information avoidance and self image
concerns, by showing that when the decisions introduce a more morally complex situation than
dictator games, image concerns may be higher and can lead to avoidance even when the infor-
mation is not instrumental and the decision cannot be changed. The results of the present paper
support the argument that decisions and actions signal one’s own characteristics and inner traits to
oneself and to others, which motivates distributive decisions (Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Bénabou
and Tirole, 2011; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).
With this study, I provide answers to questions that are relevant to many economic and social
decisions that depend on what and how much people know and how such knowledge influences
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interactions between individuals. People reciprocate more when exogenously given the informa-
tion about consequences. Many decisions in daily life depend on reciprocal relations such as social
interactions with other people, taxpayers’ relation with government, charities collecting donations
and local organizations which depend mostly on private contributions. Ariely et al.’s (2009) and
Lacetera and Macis’s (2010) experiments show that prosocial actions, such as being a blood donor
and participating in prosocial activities for good causes e.g. donations to charities could be driven
by social image motivations—to be liked or seen as a good person by others—. In this paper,
I document evidence for self image motivations. Even when there is no observer other than one-
self, knowing the consequences of a decision can decrease selfishness substantially. People choose
to avoid information in a self-serving way to circumvent moral constraints when they are given
the chance. This helps them to make self serving decisions, even the morally questionable ones,
without feeling bad about the consequences.
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1.A Supplementary Analysis
In this section, I document findings that are pre-registered but not listed as main results. In addition
to pre-registered findings, I provide an explanation to sending decisions on the trustors. Although
these results are mostly quite similar to the main results, they help to understand the underlying
mechanisms for information preferences better.
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1.A.1 Information Avoidance and Reciprocity
Although the relation between information preferences and reciprocity is listed among the main
results, Figure 1.A.1 shows this result in detail for each treatment. As can be seen in the figure,
in all treatments people who reciprocate less are more likely to say “No” to receiving information
(p = 0.014). This relation is present even when the decision has already been made. In the Ex-Post
Avoidance treatment people who reciprocated less are significantly more likely to avoid informa-
tion. Results provide evidence for the motivation to choose ignorance. In all treatments, people
who avoid information return lower amounts compared to those who want to receive information.
Ignorant decisions are closer to informed returns to the high-endowed trustors and are significantly
lower than the informed decisions to low-endowed trustors (p < 0.001).
Figure 1.A.3 shows how much time people spend on making the information choice. They
make a binary choice (“Yes” or “No”) in all three treatments before stating their WTP for this
choice to be implemented. As can be seen in the figure, people spend more time to make this
choice in the ex-ante conditions (Hidden Information and Ex-Ante Avoidance) compared to ex-
post choice (Ex-Post Avoidance) (p = 0.003). This shows that deciding whether they want to
receive information or not is a more difficult decision in the ex-ante perspective compared to the
ex-post perspective.
1.A.2 Ex-Post Information and Revisions
In this section, I document the findings on revisions which are made in the Ex-Post Avoidance
treatment after the initial decisions on how much to return is made. Figure 1.A.2 shows the revised
returns with how the gap between the final amount and the equalizing amount.
If people avoid information to not feel guilty about it, they are expected to revise this deci-
sion after learning the consequences willingly or unwillingly. However, those who willingly want
to receive that information may have two motivations: they may be homo economicus types as
defined by Grossman and Van Der Weele (2017) and do not have image concerns or bad feel-
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ings when doing something selfish, or they may be social types who always want to make social
decisions and want to learn if they manage to do so.
Table 1.A.1 supports this finding by showing the significantly increasing effect of losing
the auction on the gap between the equalizing and final returned amounts. This shows that, people
who wanted to avoid information ex-post however did not have sufficiently high WTP to win the
auction and caused a 4-unit higher gap between the equalizing return and the final return compared
to those who willingly received the information.
1.A.3 Trustors’ Sending Decision
In this game, trustors make the sending decision without having the chance to receive information
about their trustees’ initial endowment levels. In this case, what is the motivation to trust could
be due to risk preferences. As mentioned earlier, no matter what their endowment level is, 60% of
the trustors decide to send. Table 1.A.2 explains the likelihood of sending money to the trustee.
As can be seen in the table, Risk preferences significantly explains this behavior and the higher
scores of self-reported risk loving increases the likelihood of sending money significantly. Another
unobservable characteristic that estimates this relation significantly is the WTP for good causes
(charities etc.) which is self reported in the post-experiment questionnaire.
Hidden Information Ex−Ante Avoidance Ex−Post Avoidance

















Figure 1.A.1: Returned Amounts and Information Preferences
Note: This figure shows average returned amounts by treatments and information preferences. On the y
axis, Returned Amounts +/- standard error is reported.
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Figure 1.A.2: Equalizing Amounts - Revised Returns
Note: This figure shows the difference between the amount which can equalize final payoffs for
each player and the actual returned amount after revision by the player’s endowment and the
conditional endowment of the partner. Light gray bars show the conditional decisions (low or high
endowed partner) of low endowed trustors and dark gray bars show for high endowed trustors.
Bars are se.s.
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Figure 1.A.3: Time spent on information choice.
Note: This figure shows how much time (in seconds) was spent when deciding whether to receive the
information or not by treatments. As can be seen, when the information choice is made ex-ante, people
spend significantly more time compared to ex-post choice.
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F Statistic 3.660⇤⇤⇤ (df = 13; 37)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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1.B Instructions
In this section, instructions in the experiment are included. The experiment was conducted in
Turkish, the instructions here are the translated text to English.
1.B.1 Information about the roles and endowments
In the experiment there are two possible endowment levels: 15 and 35. Also there are two roles: X
and Y. Player X always has the same options: Send 10 ECU or Send 0. After this decision, Player
Y decides how much to return to Player X (if received any). At the beginning of the experiment
you are assigned to these roles and endowments randomly. Now, in that screen you are given
information on your role and endowment. Your role: X (Y) and Your Initial Endowment: 35 (15).
Please use the buttons below to confirm that you understood your role and endowment level.
1.B.2 Information for trustors
You’re assigned to role "Player X". As explained in the beginning of the game you have two
options as “Send 10ECU" and “Send 0". If you send 10 ECU to your partner it will be multiplied
by 3 by the experimenter, and received by Player Y as 30. You final payoff depends on the Player
Y’s return decision after that. You are not informed about Player Y’s initial endowment. Player
Y can make a choice that affects whether he or she learns your endowment level. This decision
might not be realized and you will not be informed about your partner’s decision on learning your
endowment level at any stage of this experiment.
1.B.3 Information for trustees
You are assigned to the role “Player Y". You start the game without being informed about Player
X’s endowment. Player X started the game without knowing your endowment as well. As ex-
plained at the beginning of the game in case Player X decides to send 10 ECU this amount will be
multiplied by 3 by the experimenter, and you will receive 30ECU. You will be asked how much
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to return over that amount to Player X. You will be given the chance to learn your partner’s initial
endowment level. Player X does not have the chance to learn yours. Player X will not be informed
whether you choose to get information or not. At the end of the game Player X will only learn
her/his own final payoff.
1.B.4 Information decision of trustees in Hidden Information and Ex-Ante Avoid-
ance
Your partner sent 10 ECU to you. That amount is multiplied by 3 by the experimenter and you
received 30 ECU. Before you decide how much to return, you can decide whether you want to learn
Player X’s endowment or not by using the buttons below. Your partner will not be informed about
that decision. Please submit your decision: “Reveal information", “Do not reveal the information”
1.B.5 Information decision of trustees in Ex-Post Avoidance
You choose and confirmed the amount you want to return :[Returned Amount]. You will learn
your partner’s initial and final endowment levels on the next screen. But you have the chance to
stop that information. You can decide whether you want to learn Player X’s endowment or not
by using the buttons below. Your partner will not be informed about your decision. Please submit
your decision: “Reveal information", “Do not reveal the information”
1.B.6 WTP elicitation with BDM
1.B.6.1 Hidden Information
You decided that you want the information. There is a price for learning player X’s endowment.
You get a bonus of 1 ECU that you can use to pay this price (or keep for yourself). How much are
you willing to pay for the information about player X’s endowment?
Please enter a number between 0 and 1. The price will be a random number between 0 and
1, and if your willingness to pay is above that realized price, your decision be implemented and
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you pay the price.
If your willingness to pay is below the realized price, you keep all of your bonus but won’t
learn player X’s endowment level.
1.B.6.2 Ex-Ante Avoidance
You decided that you do not want the information. There is a price for not learning player X’s
endowment. You get a bonus of 1 ECU that you can use to pay this price (or keep for yourself).
How much are you willing to pay for not learning the information about player X’s endowment?
Please enter a number between 0 and 1. The price will be a random number between 0 and
1, and if your willingness to pay is above that realized price, your decision be implemented and
you pay the price.
If your willingness to pay is below the realized price, you keep all of your bonus but will
learn player X’s endowment level.
1.B.6.3 Ex-Post Avoidance
You decided that you do not want the information. There is a price for not learning player X’s
endowment. You get a bonus of 1 ECU that you can use to pay this price (or keep for yourself).
How much are you willing to pay for not learning the information about player X’s endowment?
Please enter a number between 0 and 1. The price will be a random number between 0 and
1, and if your willingness to pay is above that realized price, your decision be implemented and
you pay the price.
If your willingness to pay is below the realized price, you keep all of your bonus but will
learn player X’s endowment level.
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1.B.7 Conditional returning decision
1.B.7.1 In Hidden Information and Ex-Ante Avoidance
For your partner Player X there are two possible endowment levels with equal chances. Please
enter the amount you would return for each of the two possible levels of the endowment:
15:
35:
If your price to learn [to not learn] Player X’s endowment level is [not] higher than the
randomly chosen price, you will [will not] learn the true endowment level of Player X, and only
the amount you entered for this endowment level in this screen will be implemented.
If your price is lower [higher] than the randomly chosen price, you will be asked to enter
another amount to return which will be realized regardless of the initial endowment level of Player
X.
1.B.7.2 In Ex-Post Avoidance
For your partner Player X there are two possible endowment levels with equal chances. Please
enter the amount you would return for each of the two possible levels in case you knew it:
15:
35:
If your price to not learn Player X’s endowment level is higher than the randomly chosen
price, you will not learn the true endowment level of player X, and the first amount you wanted to
return will be realized. (THE INITIAL RETURNED AMOUNT)
If your price is not higher than the randomly chosen price, you will learn the true endowment
level of player X, and the amount you entered for this endowment level in this screen will be
implemented.
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3. Imagine that you are living in a society with income levels from 0 to 10, where would you
place your income in that scale?
4. How do you see yourself: are you a person who is generally willing to take risks, or do
you try to avoid taking risks? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where a 0 means you are
“completely unwilling to take risks" and a 10 means you are very willing to take risks".
5. Please again indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are “com-
pletely unwilling to do so" and a 10 means you are “very willing to do so". You can also use
any numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, like 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
(a) How willing are you to punish a person who treats you unfairly even if there may be
costs for you?
(b) How willing are you to punish a person who treats others unfairly even if there may be
costs for you?
(c) How willing are you to give to good causes without expecting anything in return?
6. Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10. A 0 means "does not describe me at
all" and a 10 means "describes me perfectly". You can also use any numbers between 0 and
10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, like 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
(a) When someone does me a favor I am willing to return it.
(b) If I am treated very unjustly, I will take revenge at the first occasion, even if there is a
cost to do so.
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An Experimental Study of Curiosity
and Dishonesty
Abstract
In this study, we provide experimental evidence on a novel phenomenon concerning infor-
mation preferences: people strategically collect additional non-instrumental information to justify
morally questionable decisions. We conduct a virtual dice-rolling experiment where participants
roll a dice and self-report the outcome of the first roll for monetary rewards. In this setting, we
vary the extent to which participants can continue rolling the dice before reporting as well as the
displayed content of those additional roll-outcomes. We document that people systematically roll
the dice more—are more curious—when tempted to misreport. We find that curiosity is positively
correlated with the size of the lie. However, contrary to previous studies, we observe no variation
0This work is partially supported by the Research Council of Norway through its Centres of Excellence Scheme,
FAIR project No 262675. We are grateful to Catalina Franco, Thomas De Haan, Stefan Meissner, Lars Ivar Oppedal
Berge, Nina Serdaravic, Hallgeir Sjåstad, Oda Sund, Erik Ø. Sørensen, Helge Thorbjørnsen, Bertil Tungodden and the
seminar participants at Norwegian School of Economics during the Behavioral Economics Course with Lise Vesterlund
and FIBE 2019 Conference for their helpful comments and contributions. We would like to thank Centre of Ethics at
Norwegian School of Economics for financial support.
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in dishonesty across treatments regardless of the possibility to collect additional non-instrumental
information. This study provides new insights into how individuals actively shape their informa-
tion environment in pursuit of self-interest.
Keywords: Information seeking; curiosity; dishonesty; lying cost
JEL-Classifications: C99, D82, D83, D91
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2.1 Introduction
Classical theories of information economics define information as a tool that individuals use to
reach superior decisions (Stigler, 1961). Under this theory, information is valuable only from an
ex-ante perspective and if it can be used to make better decisions. However, evidence from be-
havioral research shows that people can avoid relevant information to create a moral wiggle room
in which morally questionable decisions can be excused (Dana et al., 2007; Golman et al., 2017).
Avoidance may not be the only tool to achieve moral wiggle room. Collecting additional infor-
mation can be used strategically to interpret facts toward one’s own preferences. Even though
theoretical and experimental research shows that people tend to strategically avoid information to
excuse self-interested choices (Dana et al., 2007; Grossman and Van der Weele, 2017; Golman
et al., 2017), little research has examined to what extent individuals collect additional information
to excuse the pursuit of self-interest.1 We fill this gap in the literature by providing an experi-
mental analysis of the tendency to collect more information when confronted with the temptation
to misreport. We conducted a one-shot dice-rolling game (Shalvi et al., 2011; Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi, 2013) in which participants roll a fair virtual dice and report the outcome of the
first roll for monetary rewards, with higher reported numbers resulting in higher payments. We
vary whether people can collect non-instrumental information and the content of the additional
information. We implement these treatment variations by restricting how many times people can
roll the dice before reporting, and whether the dice displays numbers or random figures after the
first roll.
Similar to avoiding information that makes it difficult to excuse selfish decisions (Gross-
man, 2014), we find evidence that curiosity is driven by a desire to justify selfish behavior. Our
main finding is that non-instrumental information is collected strategically, implying that people
1We use the term additional information to refer information that strictly speaking, is superfluous to the reporting
decision but that can be useful to individuals when trying to justify dishonest behavior. We use ‘additional’ instead
of ‘superfluous’ because we introduce a new goal for the information collection: justifying dishonesty. Hence, the
information can be useful in justifying dishonesty even though the information is not instrumental according to classical
theories.
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are strategically curious.2 Contrary to the previous literature, we find no variation in dishonesty
across treatments despite the possibility to collect additional information and the content of this
information. With our explicit focus on deliberate decisions to acquire additional non-instrumental
information when tempted to misreport, we contribute to the research on information and moral
decisions by showing that curiosity can also be driven by a desire to justify selfish behavior.
In a pre-registered experiment, we recruited 1580 US participants on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (mTurk). In the base treatment (Single Roll), participants roll the dice once and then report
the outcome. In this condition, people can continue to roll the dice after reporting while knowing
that they cannot change their report. To study how people search for additional information when
tempted to misreport, we introduce three variations to identify causal effects of different informa-
tion environments. In the Three Rolls treatment, the number of rolls is limited to three, and people
do not have a chance to roll less or more than three times before reporting the outcome of the
first roll. In the other two treatments, participants can roll as many times as they want to before
reporting. In the Multiple Numbers treatment, the dice’s sides always display numbers, whereas in
the Multiple Figures treatment, the dice displays random figures after the first roll. Since only the
outcome of the first roll should be reported, additional rolls have no instrumental value in the case
of honest reporting.
Our results provide evidence that people are systematically more curious when collecting
additional information can help justify dishonesty. As this is an observed game, we can disentan-
gle whether collecting additional information that is related or unrelated to the outcome leads to
higher misreporting. We find that people who observe lower outcomes in the first roll are more
likely to roll more times before reporting in the Multiple Numbers and the Multiple Figures treat-
ments. People in the Multiple Numbers treatment observe numeric outcomes whereas those in the
Multiple Figures see only non-order symbols in the additional rolls. The average number of rolls
is not significantly different in these two treatments. In the Multiple Numbers treatment partici-
2We call the behavioral phenomenon that people collect related and unrelated additional information to relax moral
constraints that are at odds with their self-interests strategic curiosity.
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pants roll 4.8 times on average, whereas in the Multiple Figures treatment, they roll 4.9 times on
average. This result indicates that people acquire additional information—not only to search for
justifications—but also to distract themselves from moral conflict.
We find that dishonesty does not respond to the availability of additional information. The
average size of the lie—the distance between the reported number and the actual outcome—is 0.50
units for all participants and does not significantly vary across treatments. However, we document
a positive relationship between information collection and dishonesty. Rolling the dice additional
times is correlated with higher size of the lie and this relationship is particularly strong among
dishonest participants.
Our supplementary results show that even after the report is submitted, people continue
collecting information ex-post in the Single Roll treatment. We find a significant difference in
rolling behavior between ex-ante and ex-post rolling, when the outcome of the first roll is low—but
no difference when the outcome of the first roll is high. This suggests that people are more curious
when the additional information can be used to justify reporting dishonestly. Further evidence
shows that people use curiosity to justify morally questionable decisions even after the decision
has already been made. In this ex-post rolling, we observe that participants who misreported roll
significantly more times than those who reported honestly. Dishonest reporters roll the dice 5.5
additional times after the first roll, whereas honest reporters roll it only 3.1 more times. Although
not pre-registered, these findings support our main hypotheses and findings on the strategic use of
curiosity to justify dishonesty.
This study contributes to research on preferences toward information in moral dilemmas,
which can arise both before and after a decision has been made, and both when the decision-maker
possesses incomplete and full information. Various motivations that shape information preferences
have been documented previously, and curiosity is one of the prominent drivers of information
acquisition. Loewenstein (1994) provides a review on curiosity and posits that demand for infor-
mation is intrinsic; it is “appetite for knowledge." This kind of curiosity directed toward all kinds
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of information is defined as epistemic curiosity (Litman et al., 2005). We find that curiosity need
not only arise from an intrinsic desire for information; it might also be driven by a strategic de-
sire to justify selfish behavior or distract oneself from moral conflict. More recently, Golman and
Loewenstein (2015) introduced the concept of “information gaps", which refers to people’s desire
to collect information to close the gaps between what is already known and what information is
available. Eliaz and Schotter (2010) provide experimental evidence that individuals are willing to
pay to receive information regarding the results of an intelligence test even when this informa-
tion has no value in terms of achieving higher outcomes. We find that people acquire unnecessary
information particularly when tempted to make morally questionable decisions. This extends the
literature on curiosity by showing that curiosity may be motivated by strategic reasons rather than
only an innocuous desire to collect information.
Information can play an important role in people’s self-image management when it has
diagnostic utility, revealing people’s own moral type or disposition (Bodner and Prelec, 2003;
Rabin, 1995). In this case, both avoiding and collecting information can help preserve a desired
self-image, helping people to feel good about their abilities and traits (Golman et al., 2019). Our
study expands this literature by showing that information acquisition can serve a similar function
as information avoidance. When the temptation to misreport is present, people tend to acquire non-
instrumental information. In support of this, we find that people tend to acquire non-instrumental
information that is also unrelated to the moral decision. This shows that the curiosity might not
only stem from the search for justifications, but also from the search for distractions from the moral
conflict. Prior research documents that rational inattention can cause various behavioral biases
like present bias and correlation neglect (Sims, 2006; Gabaix, 2019). We extend this research by
showing that, even when information is not related to the decision or the outcome, it can serve
as a tool for self-distraction and inattention, which can be used strategically to stick with certain
decisions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the details of the experimental
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design. Section 3 explains the procedure and the details about the sample. Section 4 presents the
results from our experiment. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.2 Experimental Design
To investigate the relation between curiosity and dishonesty, we use modified dice-rolling game
(Shalvi et al., 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). The dice-rolling game has been widely
used to study dishonesty in the previous literature (Abeler et al., 2019). The standard structure of
the game is that participants roll a fair six-sided dice and report the outcome of the first roll for
monetary rewards. In the instructions, participants are informed that higher reported numbers re-
sult in higher payments. Because participants roll the dice privately, the experimenter cannot infer
whether an individual misreports the roll outcome but can only infer dishonesty on the aggregate
level. Together with the payment structure, the privacy of the game provides those who roll low
numbers with a monetary incentive to misreport by reporting a higher number than the one they
rolled. In the case of honest reporting, the expected average reported number is 3.5, and outcomes
are uniformly distributed on the integers 1 to 6. Using this game has several advantages for inves-
tigating dishonesty since the game is of a simple nature that is easy to understand for participants.
Since the theoretical distribution is known, experimenters can detect overall dishonesty.
Because our research question required us to observe both the number of times participants
roll the dice and the outcomes of the dice rolls, we used an online dice-rolling game. In our ex-
periment, participants roll a virtual dice on a computer screen while a software records how many
times a participant rolls the dice and the outcomes of each dice-roll. Participants are informed
about this procedure in advance and are told that their payoff will only be dependent on the re-
ported number and not the factual outcome. Participants then report the outcome of their first
throw and receive payment according to their report (reporting 1 yields a payment of USD 0.5 and
reporting higher numbers increase the payment with increments of USD 0.5).
Though observed games are becoming more common in the dishonesty literature (Abeler
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et al., 2019; Gneezy et al., 2018), the observability of the reporting situation could potentially
create an experimenter demand effect and affect participants’ perceptions of the game. This could
lower participants’ level of dishonesty. However, the focus of our paper is to detect information
preferences and strategic use of information collection. Using an online experiment requires using
a virtual dice in the browser, because with a private dice we cannot collect information on how
many time times the dice has been rolled and the outcome of the first roll. Aware of the poten-
tial concerns about observability, participants are ensured that their choices remain anonymous.
Before knowing about the dice-rolling game, participants are informed that they would not be
rejected based on the submission of an incorrect answer. Before reading further instructions, all
the participants had to answer correctly on questions related to the study’s terms and conditions.
In the following instructions, participants read about the dice-rolling game and the rules of their
treatment condition. Another concern when using a virtual dice is that participants might suspect
that the dice is not fair. To combat this concern, we allowed participants to freely roll the dice
before knowing about the reporting task. We explicitly informed all participants that the dice was
programmed to be fair. To avoid priming participants on numeric values while practicing, the sides
of the dice displayed non-ordered and random symbols.
Using an observed version of the basic dice-rolling game enables us to investigate whether
the outcome of the first roll affects the likelihood that participants roll more than once, and whether
the distance between the observed first-roll outcome predicts information acquisition. This enables
us to measure the exact size of the lie and what drives information acquisition, which is crucial
for our research questions. By reaching a sample of 1,580 participants, we aimed to provide valid
findings for strategic curiosity. In addition, the virtual set-up enables us to scale up the experiment
and post the experiment on online platforms where participants can choose when and where to
complete the experiment. The sample size enables us to run a well-powered study after making
the estimations for at least 80% power (see Ay et al. (2019)).3
3Sample size is estimated with the mean values for reported die outcome from Shalvi et al. (2011). In the control
group, participants are allowed to roll the die only once, whereas in treatment participants roll multiple times. We
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2.2.1 Treatments
To study the relation between curiosity and dishonesty, we manipulate whether participants are
able to choose how many times they can roll the virtual dice. Restricting participants’ ability to
collect additional information provides exogenous variation in the decision to collect additional
information, which facilitates causal analyses between treatment groups. In total, we introduce
four treatment variations to our dice-rolling setting.
2.2.1.1 Baseline
To establish a baseline, we implemented a Single Roll treatment where the participants only roll
the virtual dice once before they submit their report. In the Single Roll treatment, the availability of
additional information is (exogenously) restricted along with their ability to justify misreporting
using additional outcome-related information. To obtain a proxy measure for pure (epistemic)
curiosity in our setting, we allowed participants in the Single Roll treatment to continue to roll the
dice as many times as they would like after they reported. Because participants could not change
their report after submission, collecting additional information has no instrumental use for the
decision.
Including our baseline, we provide a design in which we manipulate exogenous and en-
dogenous information availability.
2.2.1.2 Exogenous availability of information
To investigate whether the amount of counterfactual information—without self-selecting to collect
it—affects dishonesty, we limit the number of rolls prior to reporting in two of our treatments. In
addition to the Single Roll baseline, we implemented a Three Rolls treatment where participants
are forced to roll the dice three times before they submit their report. In this treatment, additional
used the reported numbers (so the earnings) in the control and treatment groups for our estimations. µcontrol shows the
average reported outcome in the control group whereas µtreat shows in the treatment group. In condition Single Roll
(control group) where only one roll is possible µcontrol = 3.97 and scontrol = 1.56. In the treatment where multiple rolls
are allowed µtreat = 4.45 with streat. = 1.59.
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outcome-related information is exogenously given to participants as they cannot proceed to the
reporting page before the dice has been rolled exactly three times. This enables us to investigate
whether observing additional outcomes-related information in itself increases misreporting and
whether this effect is driven by the counterfactual outcomes they observe.
In Single Roll and Three Rolls treatments, the number of rolls is exogenously limited prior
to reporting. This restriction helps us study how participants respond to this limitation and whether
it affects dishonesty.
2.2.1.3 Endogenous availability of information
To study whether participants are strategically curious, we implemented two treatments that allow
for endogenous information collection. In these two treatments, participants can roll the dice as
many times as they want to, however the content of the dice is different after the first roll.
Multiple Numbers
In the Multiple Numbers treatment, participants choose how many times to roll the dice before
reporting the first outcome. To investigate whether the content of the subsequent roll-outcomes
matters for the decision to collect additional information, we add a description underneath the
“roll" button that indicates the content of the next dice-roll. In the Multiple Numbers treatment,
the description stated, “Potential outcomes: Numbers from 1 to 6". Because participants must
actively choose to roll the dice additional times to obtain additional outcome-related information,
we can compare whether having access to this information affects misreporting differently by
being endowed with such information. This allows us to also investigate whether those who have
access to outcome-related (counterfactual) information systematically roll more when they observe
low roll-outcomes in their first (actual) roll.
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Multiple Figures
In the Multiple Figures treatment, participants choose how many times they roll the dice before
reporting but, after the first roll, subsequent roll-outcomes display non-ordered symbols instead
of numbers. Changing the displayed content of the sides of the dice restricts participants’ access
to additional outcome-related information that can (directly) help justify misreporting by report-
ing the best throw. Rolling the figures-dice only generates unrelated information. Yet, acquiring
unrelated information can serve as a distraction from their moral standard to report honestly and
therefore make misreporting less threatening to their moral self-view (Mazar et al., 2008). To
be rationally inattentive as Gabaix (2019) proposes, participants can search for distraction by
collecting unrelated information. The description underneath the “roll" button states “Potential
outcomes: Random symbols only" to remind participants.4 In contrast to the Multiple Numbers
treatment where participants know that additional roll-outcomes display (counterfactual) numeric
information, participants in the Multiple Figures treatment know that rolling the dice additional
times only generates unrelated symbolic information. This allows us to examine whether partici-
pants are more curious about the additional information when the information has more potential
to justify misreporting and whether observing related information is more effective in justifying
misreporting than observing unrelated information.
To eliminate the effects of self-selection to rolling multiple times, our design enables us to
compare exogenous (Three Rolls) and endogenous choice of multiple rolls (Multiple Numbers).
See Figure 2.1 for an overview of the design.
4The symbols displayed on the sides of the dice are identical to the ones on the practice dice.
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Figure 2.1: Potential Outcome of the Dice by Treatments
Note: This figure shows the potential outcomes of the dice in each treatment. Just to represent potential outcomes and the limitations
of the treatments, we visualize four random outcomes. In Single Roll and Three Rolls treatments number of rolls is limited by design
whereas in the Multiple Numbers and Multiple Figures treatments participants can roll the dice as many times as they want (unlimited).
In the Multiple Figures treatment participants only see figures instead of numbers.
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2.3 Sample and Procedure
The experiment was posted as a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) on the Amazon Mechanical Turk
(mTurk) crowdsourcing platform in June-July 2019. The interface of the experiment was pro-
grammed using oTree (Chen et al., 2016). Before data was collected for this experiment, our de-
sign was approved by Institutional Review Board at the NHH Norwegian School of Economics.5
Our hypotheses are pre-registered with AEA-RCT Registry (Ay et al., 2019).6 Each of the 1,580
participants participated in only one treatment and was not aware of the other experimental treat-
ments.
All participants received the same instructions about the task, the payoff structure, and the
overall procedure of the game. Participants were informed that their answers are recorded but
would be kept anonymous and that the researchers cannot trace their choices back to their personal
identities or their MTurk profiles. The instructions inform participants that all submitted work
would be accepted regardless of accuracy and that payments would be transferred without any
further questions shortly after the completion of the task. We reassured participants about their
anonymity and the exclusion rules because participants could refrain from acting dishonestly due
to reputation concerns on the online crowdsourcing platform.7 To avoid potential experimenter-
demand effects, we provided this information to participants before the instructions about the
dice-rolling task.8
Initially, participants started by practicing with a trial dice for as long as they wanted before
reading about the main experiment. The sides of the trial dice displayed only non-ordered and ran-
dom symbols and all participants had to roll the practice dice at least once before proceeding. This
5IRB Application number: NHH-IRB 07/19.
6Before running the main experiment, we conducted a pre-test on the same platform with 125 participants.
7Comments that participants give during the experiment also suggest that many were experiencing a moral dilemma
in the reporting situation. For example, one participant wrote, “I did report the correct first roll of ’2’. (I was curious
and did roll the dice other times, but my report was truthful and accurate.)." Another wrote, “I wanted to report a higher
dice roll for more money. I did not."
8Payments to participants is automated in the experiment, which allowed us to pay bonuses without storing worker
IDs. We did not store worker IDs and IP-addresses to ensure anonymity. We deliberately abstained from using con-
tentious words such as dishonesty, lying, or misreporting to avoid experimenter-demand effects. Participants were given
a participation code once they accepted the HIT, which prevented them from retaking the HIT. No duplication of par-
ticipation code was found.
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method was chosen to reassure participants about the fairness of the dice without priming them
with numeric outcomes. After practicing with the trial dice, participants read the instructions for
the dice-rolling task along with the payment structure. After reporting their roll-outcomes, partic-
ipants answered questions related to the experiment (e.g., perceived descriptive norms of similar
dice-rolling games, self-reported feelings of being observed, and perceived legitimacy of rolling
more than once), along with demographic questions. Overall, the experiment took participants
approximately 7 minutes to complete, and the average payment was USD 2.5, which included a
participation fee of USD 0.5.
Table 2.1: Summary descriptives table by groups of treatment
Multiple Figures Multiple Numbers Single Roll Three Rolls
N = 386 N = 397 N = 409 N = 388
Panel A
Age 37.8 (11.5) 38.7 (12.1) 39.0 (12.5) 38.3 (10.5)
Gender (= F) 0.47 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50)
Education:
High School or Less 38 (11.5%) 52 (14.7%) 45 (12.5%) 41 (12.2%)
Higher Than High School 292 (88.5%) 301 (85.3%) 316 (87.5%) 295 (87.8%)
Panel B
Norms 4.93 (2.80) 4.88 (2.60) 4.81 (2.78) 5.15 (2.76)
Feeling Observed 7.02 (3.25) 6.98 (3.21) 6.77 (3.13) 6.82 (3.36)
Political Views 3.39 (2.39) 3.48 (2.49) 3.18 (2.43) 3.45 (2.37)
Note: Standars errors are in parentheses. Values in the upper part of the table are self-reported demographics and beliefs elicited with
a survey. It is clear from this table that sample was well balanced across treatments in terms of observable characteristics and beliefs.
Political views are scaled from 0 (very liberal) to 8 (very conservative).
Table 2.1 contains descriptive statistics across the different treatment treatments. In Panel A
we report the demographic measures, and in Panel B we report some of the self reported beliefs
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that were collected the post-experiment questionnaire. Assignment to treatments is balanced in
terms of observable characteristics and beliefs. The average age of participants is 38, and 46%
of our sample is female. The majority of participants have at least a high school degree. Panel B
in Table 2.1 provides an overview of covariates included in our analyses and estimations. Norm
shows the beliefs on the levels of dishonesty in general, whereas Feeling Observed refers to how
observed they felt during the experiment on a scale of 0 to 10. Political Views are elicited on a
scale from 0 (Very Liberal) to 10 (Very Conservative). Our results show that participants are more
liberal overall. We observe that participants’ reported beliefs about the prevailing dishonesty norm
or feelings of being observed do not differ significantly across treatments (Kruskal Wallis test
results for norms c23 = 2.87, p = 0.41 and for feeling observed c23 = 2.77 and p = 0.43).
2.4 Results
In this section, we report the findings of our experiment. Reported results include both pre-
registered and supplementary analyses to clarify our findings. Our results based on two sources of
randomization: treatment variations and the outcome of the dice in the first roll. The first result
we provide on dishonesty stems from the first source of randomization, whereas the results on
curiosity are based on the second source of randomization. All the hypotheses and analyses are
pre-registered except for the analyses on the number of rolls in the Single Roll treatment in Result
2b and Result 3b.
In the first subsection, we provide findings on dishonesty across treatments. Although our
design has the similar features to Shalvi et al.’s (2011), the main goal of our paper is to investigate
curiosity in a moral context. For this reason, in the following sections we document our findings
on information collection and whether it could be strategically chosen. Using an observed game
enables us to provide analyses on information collection based on the outcome of the first roll
whereas in studies using unobserved games, it is not possible to investigate such behavior and
motivations for it (Shalvi et al., 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Finally, we document
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the correlation between curiosity and dishonesty.
2.4.1 Dishonesty
Our design provides two channels to investigate the impact of additional information on dishon-
esty: exogenous (Single Roll and Three Rolls) and endogenous variation of availability (Multiple
Numbers and Multiple Figures). Collecting additional information on the outcome by rolling the
dice multiple times enables participants to observe outcome-related (numeric) or unrelated (sym-
bolic) information before reporting. In the case of honest reporting, the average expected reported
number from the dice-rolling is 3.5.
Looking at the average reported numbers, we observe deviation from the theoretical expec-
tation under honesty (p < 0.001). In our baseline Single Roll, average reported number is 3.94 (sd.
= 1.79). We find no significant statistical difference on dishonesty across treatments (Three Rolls,
3.92 (sd. = 1.76) in Multiple Numbers, 4.12 (sd. = 1.66) in Multiple Figures, p = 0.125). Figure
2.1 shows the distribution of reported numbers in each treatment, which reveal that distributions of
reported numbers are similar across treatments. The dashed line across Figure 2.1 indicates each
number’s theoretical frequency, i.e., 1/6. It can be seen in the figure that the share of reports below
"4" are lower than the theoretical fraction, whereas reports of “6" are higher and also the highest of
all reports. This figure shows that participants tend to report higher numbers than “3" and mostly
“6" if they decide to misreport.
In the experiment, we could observe both the actual and the reported number for each par-
ticipant and are therefore able to develop a precise measure of dishonesty. These precise measures
reveal that 19.9% of the participants in the Single Roll treatment, 24.6% in the Three Rolls treat-
ment, 20.4% in the Multiple Numbers treatment, and 20.5% in Multiple Figures treatment misre-
ported the outcome of the first roll. The share of dishonest reports is in line with the values shown
in Abeler et al.’s (2019) meta-study on dishonesty experiments. Findings from the previous litera-
ture suggest that observing higher numeric outcomes than the actual outcome makes lying easier
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by enabling participants to report the best outcome that they observe instead of making a fictitious
report (Shalvi et al., 2011, 2015).
Our result shows that participants in all treatments are dishonest, and the level of dishonesty
is not significantly different across treatments. This result contrasts with previous experimental
findings in unobserved settings and our hypothesis on dishonesty in the pre-analysis plan. For
example, Shalvi et al.’s (2011) study shows an increase in dishonesty when the participants are
instructed to roll multiple times compared to only rolling once. In our experiment, the Three Rolls
treatment is similar to the “Multiple Rolls" treatment in (Shalvi et al., 2011) regarding how many
times participants are instructed to roll. In the Three Rolls treatment in which participants are
instructed to roll three times and were not given a chance to change it, we do not find any sig-
nificant difference in the level of misreporting (reported number (4.15) and distance (0.64)). The
Three Rolls treatment provides both a comparison to Shalvi et al. (2011) and serves to control for
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Reported Numbers
Note: This figure shows the distribution of reported numbers for each treatment separately. The dashed line represents theoretical
expectation on the share of each outcome from rolling a dice which is equal to 0.16. As can be seen fraction of 5 and 6 is higher than
the theoretical expectation whereas fraction of reporting lower numbers fell below the theoretical expectation.
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self-selection in our experiment. However, we do not observe an increase in misreporting in the
Multiple Numbers treatment compared to Three Rolls.
Our results show that there is no difference in dishonesty between the settings where access
to additional information is exogenously limited and those where it is endogenously decided.
Although the level differences are not significant between treatments, mean reported values are
higher than 3.5 in all treatments. This shows dishonesty in all treatments, no matter the availability
and the content of the information.
Since we observe the actual outcome of the first roll, we can analyze the “size of the lie" or
the distance between the reported and actual outcome. The “distance" shows the deviation from
the actual outcome.9 We find no significant variation in distance between treatments (p = 0.383).
In our pre-analysis plan, our hypothesis was that availability of additional information increases
dishonesty. Our findings instead suggest that the availability of additional information does not
affect misreporting.
Result 1: Availability of additional information - either exogenously or endogenously
given - does not increase misreporting compared to having no additional information
available before reporting.
2.4.2 Curiosity
In this section, we provide our findings on curiosity by first analyzing participants’ rolling behav-
ior before reporting (ex-ante) and then the same behavior after the report is submitted (ex-post).
For ex-ante information collection, our two treatments enable us to investigate curiosity based
on the content of information: outcome-related information in Multiple Numbers and unrelated
information in Multiple Figures. When additional roll-outcomes display numbers (Multiple Num-
bers), rolling more times generates counterfactual information, which has been previously shown
to make misreporting more frequent (Shalvi et al., 2011). Observing desired counterfactuals helps
9Distance is 0.58 (sd. = 1.39) in Single Roll, 0.64 (sd. = 1.49) in Three Rolls, 0.47 (sd. = 1.40) in Multiple Numbers
and 0.53 (sd. = 1.30) Multiple Figures.
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to decrease the psychological distance between the actual outcome and the desired one.10 By con-
trast, when the additional roll-outcomes display random symbols (Multiple Figures), participants
cannot use the additional information to reduce the psychological distance between the actual roll
outcome and the desired one. In Multiple Numbers treatment, the information is always outcome
related since the outcomes of the dice are always numeric, whereas in the Multiple Figures treat-
ment, outcomes are unrelated since the dice shows random figures after the first roll.
In the pre-analysis plan, we hypothesized a higher number of rolls in the Multiple Numbers
treatment compared to the Multiple Figures treatment. We find however, no difference in rolling
behavior between observing outcome-related information (numeric) and information that is ran-
dom and unrelated (symbols). Participants who can roll freely before they report throw the dice
4.98 (15.5) times after the first roll when the additional rolls have numeric outcomes, whereas this
number is 4.82 (17.6) when the rolls have symbolic outcomes (p = 0.96). Figure 2.2 shows the av-
erage number of rolls prior to reporting in the Multiple Numbers and Multiple Figures treatments.
Figure 2.2: Number of Rolls Before Reporting
Note: Bars are standard errors. This figure shows average number of rolls for each treatment in which participants can roll the dice
as many times as they want. For each treatment, the number of rolls is shown by the outcome of the first roll as below or equal 3( 3)
and above 3(>3). As can be seen in the figure, participants who saw lower first outcome roll significantly more times than those who
saw higher numbers. This holds for both Multiple-rolls treatments (numbers and figures) in which participants can roll as many times
as they want before reporting. (p < 0,001)
10By desired counterfactuals, we refer to the higher numbers than the outcome of the first roll.
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As shown in the figure, when faced with a lower outcome in the first roll, the number of rolls is
significantly higher in both treatments. This result is in line with our pre-registered hypothesis.
Result 2a: People are curious and collect additional information even when the ad-
ditional information is irrelevant to the task. Curiosity is higher when the outcome of
the first roll is low.
Although not pre-specified, we want to further investigate whether people who rolled more
when they observed a low outcome do so out of “pure curiosity" or whether they are searching
to justify misreporting. This former type of curiosity is defined as “epistemic curiosity," which is
a desire to collect information even when it is not targeted to a certain end (Loewenstein, 1994;
Litman et al., 2005). To assess this, we let those in the Single Roll treatment have the opportunity
to keep rolling the dice after they submit the report. These participants are explicitly told that they
would not be able to change their report but could keep on rolling if they wanted to do so. We
use their ex-post rolling (after reporting) behavior in Single Roll treatment as a benchmark for
seeking non-instrumental information out of pure curiosity. Figure 2.3 shows number of rolls in
both Single Roll and Multiple Numbers treatments based on the outcome of the first roll (greater
than 3 and lower or equal than 3). In both treatments, participants who roll lower outcomes in the
first roll rolled significantly more times than those with a high outcome in the first roll (p < 0.01
for both treatments). Distribution of the number of rolls can be seen in Figure 2.4. Number of
ex-post rolls is significantly lower than number of ex-ante rolls (4.98 in Multiple Numbers, 2.75 in
Single Roll, p = 0.005).
Result 2b: Curiosity is observed even after the decision has been made—when addi-
tional information has no instrumental value. A low outcome of the first roll increases
the number of ex-post rolls.
10We use instrumentality in terms of affecting the final result. Even though it cannot change the reported value,
ex-post information may help people validate their dishonest reports. We provide further analysis of this behavior in the
next section.
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Our design enables us to provide findings on the rolling behavior based on the outcome of
the dice. Conditioning on the outcome of the first roll has not been possible in previous research
that has relied on hidden rolls. Our results show that the level of information collection is not sig-
nificantly affected by the content of information. Our results document that participants continue
rolling the dice even after reporting. Although additional information has no use, this behavior
could be motivated by a desire to justify dishonesty. In the next section, we continue documenting
our results on motivations for curiosity.
2.4.3 Motivations for Curiosity
A tension between reporting honestly and reporting self-servingly arises when there is a large dis-
tance between the desired outcome (rolling a high number) and the actual outcome. We conjecture
that this tension gives rise to a demand for information that reduces the gap between the desired
Figure 2.3: Ex- Ante and Ex-Post Number of Rolls
Note: This figure shows average number of rolls for each treatment in which participants can roll the dice as many times as they want
and the outcomes of rolls are numbers. The only difference is that in the Multiple Numbers treatment they can roll the dice before
reporting (ex-ante) whereas in the Single Roll treatment they can only roll additional rolls after reporting (ex-post). Number of rolls
is shown by the outcome of the first roll as below or equal 3( 3) and above 3(>3). As can be seen in the figure, participants who
saw lower first roll-outcomes roll significantly more times than those who saw higher numbers. This holds for both Multiple Numbers
and Single Roll treatments in which participants can roll as many times as they want before reporting. Although this result is not
pre-registered we find it valuable to show the information seeking even when there is no instrumental value that can affect the final
reporting behavior and the outcome.
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and the actual outcome. Demand for information is driven by the need to find justifications that can
reduce the perceived distance or gap (Shalvi et al., 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013).
The demand will be greater the larger the distance is between the actual outcome (e.g. rolling a
‘one’) and the number that one would prefer to report (e.g. ‘six’). We pre-specified in the pre-
analysis plan that people are more likely to acquire information that could reduce the perceived
distance between the factual outcome and the wealth-maximizing outcome when this distance is
large (e.g. rolling a one) compared to the when there is less or no distance (e.g. rolling a five). That
is, when honesty concerns are in conflict with self-interest, individuals actively try to reduce the
intrinsic cost of lying by acquiring information that may reduce the perceived size of the potential
lie.11 To investigate whether curiosity is used to reach higher monetary outcomes, we document
estimations for the information collection in relation to the outcome of the first roll and other
behavioral parameters in this section.
Figure 2.4: Distribution of Number of Rolls
Note: this figure shows the distribution of how many times participants chose to roll by treatments in the rows and the outcome of the
first roll on the columns.
11Our estimation is based on Gneezy et al. (2018), however, the method we use deviates to correctly specify impacts
of our observed design.
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Our analysis on motivations to collect additional information prior to reporting focuses on
how many times participants choose to roll the dice in the Multiple Numbers and Multiple Figures
treatments. In these treatments, participants have the opportunity to roll as many times as they
would like to before they report the outcome of the first roll. We hypothesized that observing a
low outcome on the first roll produces a demand for justification to misreport. Among participants
who could freely roll the dice with numbers, we find that the lower their first roll, the more likely
they are to roll again. Table 2.1 shows that for both treatments, higher outcome of the first roll
significantly decreases the likelihood that the subject would roll more than once (p < 0.01).
Result 3a: Outcome of the first roll affects the likelihood of rolling more than once,
even when the additional outcome is not related. The lower the outcome of the first
roll, the higher the likelihood of continued rolling ex-ante.
This result supports our hypothesis on curiosity; people can be strategically curious to jus-
tify morally questionable decisions when the actual outcome is low. For lower outcomes of the
first roll ( 3), the number of rolls is significantly higher before reporting (ex-ante) in the Mul-
Table 2.1: Logistic Regression for Rolling More than Once
Dependent variable:
Keep Rolling ( = 1)
(Multiple Numbers) (Multiple Figures)






Log Likelihood  225.443  218.645
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01 se.s are in parentheses
Note: Standars errors are in parentheses. Results show that, in both treatments higher observed numbers in the first roll decreases the
likelihood of “Keep Rolling” significantly. dydx shows the marginal effect of ”First Roll”. Unlisted controls: Age, Gender, Norms,
Feeling Observed, Political views, Income level, Education Level, Belief on Lying in the Experiment.
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tiple Numbers treatment than after reporting (ex-ante) in the Single Roll (4.61 in Multiple Rolls,
3.23 in Single Roll, p = 0.03). We do not observe a significant difference between ex-ante and
ex-post number of rolls for participants who see higher outcomes in the first roll (2.88 in Multiple
Numbers, 2.16 in Single Roll, p = 0.49).
This finding is in line with Gneezy et al.’s (2018) finding which states that the distance
between reported and actual outcomes drives the intrinsic lying costs. We find that when the dis-
tance between the desired and actual outcomes increases, participants seem to desire information
that could reduce this psychological distance. This finding suggests that people actively attempt
to shape their information-set according to what serves their self-interest. Participants search for
more information when they face lower outcomes in the first roll, and they search for such infor-
mation significantly more when it can be acquired before rather than after the reporting decision.
Figure 2.5 shows number of rolls after reporting by honest versus dishonest participants
(2.56 for honest reporting, 4.35 for misreporting, p = 0.043). As shown in the figure, participants
who reported honestly roll significantly fewer times than participants who reported dishonestly.
Showing that participants roll more after they misreport compared to if they reported honestly is
important as it provides additional evidence that participants seem to use additional information
as a way to assess the credibility of both potential and past lies—even when there is no monetary
gain from rolling more and continued rolling has an opportunity cost.
Participants are more likely to roll the dice to a greater extent when the outcome of the
first roll is low. However, in the ex-ante treatment, participants acquire more information than
the ex-post situation, supporting our hypothesis on “strategic" curiosity. By design, the additional
rolls before the reporting can be considered when reporting, but additional rolls after the reporting
cannot affect the submitted report.
Result 3b: Participants who reported dishonestly are more likely to collect additional
information after reporting.
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2.4.4 Information, Curiosity and Dishonesty
Our results show a clear behavioral pattern on low values of the first roll and curiosity. When
we define strategic curiosity, we posit that it is a tool to make self-serving decisions easier. To
investigate whether participants use the additional information for this goal, we provide evidence
for the relationship between the distance of the lie and the number of rolls.
We observe no significant difference in the level of misreporting between Multiple Num-
bers and Multiple Figures treatments. Although we do not observe treatment differences in re-
ported numbers, Table 2.2 shows that distance (size of the lie) is significantly higher among those
who chose to roll the dice more, regardless of the content of the dice—numbers or figures. As
mentioned earlier, Multiple Numbers and Multiple Figures treatments are the ones in which partic-
ipants “endogenously" decide how many times to roll the dice. In the Single Roll and Three Rolls
treatments, the number of rolls is exogenously decided.
In terms of relevancy of the content, Multiple Numbers and Multiple Figures treatments pro-
vide variation of the content of the endogenously collected information.12 We find a very similar
Figure 2.5: Number of Ex-Post Rolls and Dishonesty
Note: This figure shows the mean number of rolls for the Single Roll treatment by groups of dishonest (misreport) and honest reporting.
After reporting, participants who misreported roll significantly more times than participants who reported honestly (p = 0.042).
12Relevancy is used in terms of additional information being relevant to the first roll and the reporting decision.
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effect of number of rolls on distance in both treatments; it is positively and significantly associ-
ated with the distance of the lie. This shows that even though the effect size is different, curiosity
toward both related and unrelated information is positively related, with greater distance between
the actual outcome and the reported number.
These results can provide insights on motivations of dishonesty for two different types of
information: with related information, dishonesty is driven by the fact that there is a potential
higher outcome, and with unrelated information, the mechanism might be similar to distraction.
Since it was not one of the main concerns of our research, the latter mechanism is not documented
in detail. Effects of inattention and distraction have been previously documented in different be-
havioral concepts than dishonesty previously (Gabaix, 2019; Falk and Zimmermann, 2016). We
show the same dishonesty level in these treatments and the same effect of rolling more on this
level, suggesting that different mechanisms cause similar effects on dishonesty.
Result 4: Curiosity is associated with misreporting regardless of the content of addi-
tional information.
Table 2.2 also shows that, in the Single Roll treatment in which participants could roll the
dice only once prior to reporting the outcome, the time participants spent on the rolling page (Time
Rolling) is positively associated with misreporting.13 This result suggests that, even without rolling
the dice more times, people who report dishonestly spend more time on the page before doing
so. This finding supports the argument that morality is the intuitive choice in social decisions.
For example, Cappelen et al. (2016) show a strong association between short response time and
fair behavior, which means fairness is the intuitive choice in social decisions. In a meta study
on dishonesty experiments, Köbis et al. (2019) show that in situations where dishonesty affects
others, honesty is the intuitive choice.
13Note that in the rolling page of Single Roll treatment, participants are not allowed to roll after the first one, but
they can deliberately stay on the page deliberately until they click the “Next" button. This variable is not added for the
analysis in other treatments because people stay on the page while rolling the dice. In the Single Roll treatment, they
cannot do anything on this page.
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In none of the treatments is the feeling of being observed is related to individual misreport-
ing. This shows that feeling observed during the game did not contribute to the treatment effects
that are documented in this paper. In all treatments, beliefs on norms about dishonesty are asso-
ciated with larger lies (i.e., larger distance from the first outcome). Beliefs on norms are elicited
by asking participants how likely others are to report dishonestly in similar experimental settings.
This is a self-reported measure on participants’ beliefs about others’ dishonest behavior in similar
settings. Our findings show that beliefs about others’ dishonesty is correlated with larger-distance
lies. Although these mentioned effects are low, they support related research suggesting that be-
liefs about the prevailing descriptive norms (i.e., others’ dishonesty in similar games) influence
people’s tendency to be dishonest (Bicchieri et al., 2019).
Table 2.2: Predictors of "distance" (Reported - Real Outcome) across treatments
Dependent variable: distance
(Single Roll) (Three Rolls) (Multiple Numbers) (Multiple Figures)




Time Report 0.002 0.013 0.012 0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005)
Age  0.011⇤  0.018⇤⇤  0.027⇤⇤⇤  0.007
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Sex (F)  0.400⇤⇤  0.136  0.270⇤  0.469⇤⇤⇤
(0.157) (0.180) (0.154) (0.149)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 347 317 324 331
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01 se.s are in parentheses
Size of the lie: Standard errors are in parentheses. To explain distance of the lie, we use behavioral measures that are collected in
the game and other covariates like self-reported unobservable characteristics. Time Report variables show the seconds participants
spent on reporting and rolling the dice. A subset of data used to make this estimation to exclude participants with first outcome of 6
(since including these participants masks the effects of other covariates with 0 lying). Unlisted controls: Political view, Income level,
Education Level, Belief on Lying in the Experiment. When we make the same estimation for only dishonest people, we observe that 1
additional roll increases the distance by 0.23 units, which means 4 additional rolls increases the lie by 1 unit for dishonest reporters.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
Morality is often considered to restrict people from making self-serving decisions that are morally
questionable. As opposed to treating morality as a goal in itself, it is sometimes treated as a set of
internalized constraints on people’s real goal of pursuing self-interest. In that case, people strategi-
cally acquire information to create moral wiggle room that makes otherwise morally unacceptable
decisions appear morally acceptable. As people increasingly have access to an abundance of infor-
mation, understanding how people use their discretion over various kinds of information in moral
dilemmas is increasingly important.
In this study, we investigate how people strategically collect additional non-instrumental
information to justify morally questionable decisions. We use a modified dice-rolling experiment
where the availability and the content of additional information vary between subjects. This de-
sign enables us to disentangle what motivates collecting additional information, and to investigate
how this affects dishonest reporting. We provide novel evidence that curiosity about related and
unrelated information is heightened when being curious can help circumvent the moral obligation
to report honestly. Even though people’s curiosity is associated with more dishonest behavior, we
find no treatment effect on dishonest reporting, suggesting a more complex underlying mechanism.
We obtain evidence that people acquire additional information—not only to search for
justifications—but also to distract themselves from the moral conflict. Even after the reporting
decision has been made in the Single Roll treatment, we find that people who misreport are more
likely to acquire additional information to evaluate the credibility of their past lies. Further analy-
ses provide additional evidence that people tend to use additional information to assess the credi-
bility of potential lies rather than merely searching for justifications for selfish behavior.
Our study fills an important gap in the behavioral research literature by showing that infor-
mation acquisition can be a strategic behavior. Previous research on information preferences in
moral context has devoted considerable attention on information avoidance (Golman et al., 2017;
Dana et al., 2007; Grossman and Van der Weele, 2017). We provide experimental evidence that
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people actively collect non-instrumental information when tempted by the benefits of being dis-
honest. Our findings support the notion that people attempt to circumvent moral constraints rather
than having a preference for morality (Rabin, 1995). As people often have discretion over how
much information to collect and consider before making moral decisions, understanding endoge-
nous information collection and processing choices is essential to improve our understanding of
behavior and to design better policies.
We provide evidence that information collection is linked with higher levels of dishonesty
even when the information is not related to the task. Although our design limits us to providing
a more detailed investigation of the motivations, previous literature suggests that people might
rationally seek inattention to distract themselves when making decisions (Gabaix, 2019; Sims,
2003, 2006). In the domain of moral cognition, becoming inattentive to moral standards can make
it easier for people to excuse diverging from their standards (Mazar et al., 2008). Our findings on
the systematic collection of unrelated information provide another interesting trait: people seem
to collect information to distract themselves from moral dilemmas.
Even though our experimental investigation is concerned with endogenous information col-
lection, we also contribute to research on how counterfactual information affects moral cognition
(Shalvi et al., 2011; Bassarak et al., 2017; Effron, 2018). Previous literature finds that people tend
to process new pieces of information to confirm their own beliefs. Though we find evidence of this,
we find that people seem to not change their decisions based on the content of the additional infor-
mation. Instead, our results suggest that dishonest people tend to acquire additional information to
justify their dishonest decisions.
Our results provide insights that increase our understanding of the link between informa-
tion and moral decisions by suggesting that people could use unnecessary information to justify
morally questionable decisions. This insight is important as people have access to extensive infor-
mation about many different topics in their daily life. Thus, we believe our results can increase
our comprehension of social and economic decisions as our research serves as a step towards
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understanding the psychological mechanisms that drive the strategic use of curiosity.
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2.A Supplementary Analysis
2.A.1 Details of Dishonesty
Shalvi et al. (2011) argue that observing higher counterfactuals causes misreporting to reach higher
potential payoff. On the other hand, Gneezy et al. (2018) predicts that participants would refrain
from fully using the strategic advantages when lying as the size of the lie increases. In this section
we report results about lying behavior that are not pre-registered. Figure 2.A.1 shows the average
reported number by the first roll. As can be seen, for every outcome we observe lying which is
higher for values lower than 4 compare to higher outcomes. Our results show that participants who
misreported mostly reported 6, while some share report lower numbers as can be seen in Figure
2.A.2. Distribution of overall (pooled sample of honest and dishonest reporters) reports also show
high share of 6 reports in Figure 2.1. The dashed line in Figure 2.1 shows the theoretical share of
each number which is 1/6 (0.16).
2.A.2 Dishonesty and Ex-Post Information Collection
As shown in the main results, we observe that people who see a lower outcome in the first roll
and who misreport are more likely to roll the dice ex-post, after the report has been submitted.
To complete the analysis on that here, we provide an an extra analysis on the relation between
dishonesty and ex-post rolls. As can be seen in the Table 2.A.1, there is a positive relation between
the distance (the size of the lie) and the ex-post number of rolls. As mentioned earlier, although this
result is not pre-registered we find it crucial to understand the relation between moral decisions
and curiosity. In a digital dice rolling game, people who misreport collect information by rolling
the dice not only before reporting but also even after the report has been submitted.
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Figure 2.A.1: Dishonesty and the outcome of the first roll
Figure 2.A.2: Distribution of dishonesty




































Note: This figure shows the distribution of reported numbers for the participants who reported dishonestly. The figure is separated by
the potential outcomes of the first roll and each column corresponds to a level as indicated in the upper titles. Most of the participants
reported 6 while for lower outcomes of the first roll slightly higher variation can be seen. We do not observe any “negative lying".
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Table 2.A.1: Dishonesty in the Single Roll treatment and Number of Ex-post Rolls
Dependent variable:
distance
# of Ex-Post Rolls 0.058⇤⇤⇤
(0.022)










Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Ex-post rolls and dishonesty: Standars errors are in parentheses. To explain the relation between ex-post rolls and dishonesty, we use
behavioral measures that are collected in the game and other covariates such as self-reported unobservable characteristics. A subset
of data was used to make this estimation to exclude participants with first outcome of 6 (since including these participants masks
the effects of other covariates with 0 lying). Unlisted controls: Political view, Income level, Education Level, Belief on Lying in the
Experiment.
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2.B Instructions
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Figure 2.B.1: Instructions for the Three Rolls treatment
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Figure 2.B.2: Instructions for the Multiple Numbers treatment
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Information Avoidance—The Role of
Certainty, Rewards and Overconfidence
Abstract
In this paper we investigate an objective for active information avoidance: self-image protection.
In two experiments, we study how information preferences can change when the information is
ego related and hurtful to self-image, and when it is neutral. To vary the neutrality of information,
in the first experiment we use information about one’s relative rank in an intelligence test and in
the second experiment we use “neutral” information about a randomly drawn number. Our results
show that people avoid ego related information and are willing to pay to do so. However, this
behavior is not related to confidence and certainty about beliefs in one’s own skills. We observe
that a high share of people avoid “neutral” information even though it is not ego-related, and the
willingness to pay to do so is positive. Besides avoidance, we provide findings that show people’s
0This work was partially supported by the Research Council of Norway through its Centres of Excellence Scheme,
FAIR project No 262675. We are grateful to Alexander Cappelen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, Bertil Tungodden and the seminar
participants at FAIR, Norwegian School of Economics and Brown University, Department of Economics. We would
like to thank Björn Bartling and Botond Kőzsegi for helpful and fruitful comments on our paper.
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willingness to pay to receive neutral information responds to the value of information. Our findings
contributes to the literature on information and ego utility by showing that these preferences might
not be driven solely by self-image concerns.
Keywords: Information avoidance; ego utility; self-image; random choice
JEL-Classifications: C91, D82, D83, D91
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3.1 Introduction
Economic theories and experiments show that people tend to process information about their own
abilities in a biased manner. Previous studies show that this behavior stems from the fact that peo-
ple strive for a positive image of being skillful (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002). This creates a motive
to avoid and to demand information other than the usefulness of it to maintain a positive self-
image. people tend to avoid information if they anticipate bad news (Ganguly and Tasoff, 2017;
Eil and Rao, 2011), particularly when faced with a judgement about attributes that are important
to people, such as one’s own intelligence. If the anticipated content is positive about their skills,
intelligence and/or monetary gains, people demand information (Eliaz and Schotter, 2010; Karls-
son et al., 2009). Kőszegi (2006) relates this behavior to confidence about one’s own skills and
abilities: people with low confidence may avoid information if they are not certain of their beliefs
about their abilities and thus, have fragile self esteem, whereas those who are overconfident and
certain are not expected to avoid information, because their beliefs are less likely to change and
their self esteem is not fragile.
These studies suggest that people want to protect themselves and to preserve a positive self-
image by not learning potentially unpleasant things about themselves such as being less intelligent
or less successful than expected. In this paper we experimentally investigate preferences over
ego related information when receiving or avoiding this information directly influences monetary
outcomes. We give people the chance to earn a bonus payment by learning their rank relative to
their peers in an intelligence test. We introduce two treatments in which we vary whether receiving
or avoiding information is free. With this variation we elicit the effects of the default settings on the
information choice. We show that approximately half of all participants do not want to learn their
relative rank even when learning can increase final monetary payoffs. However, we also document
that a substantial share of people demand ego related information. To establish the effects of ego
utility on information choice, we run a second study with Neutral Information that has no ego
relevant content. Introducing this second study enables us to compare information acquisition
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behavior when the information is ego related and when it is not.
Our findings contribute to the literature on information preferences and ego utility by show-
ing that people are willing to avoid learning potentially hurtful news even when that means that
they forego a certain monetary payoff. These results provide evidence on the importance of ego
utility when making choices over information and extends the experimental evidence on avoidance
from potentially bad news about one’s own intelligence by documenting the trade-off between
ego utility and monetary payoffs. Contrary to the previous arguments on ego utility, we find no
significant relation between confidence, certainty about one’s own intelligence and information
avoidance behavior.
To investigate information preferences in relation to ego utility we ran the experiment (Ego
Utility) in October 2018. We recruited 405 undergraduate students to participate in a laboratory
experiment at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), one of the most selective business
schools in Norway. Participants were recruited from first-year students who have not finished any
obligatory courses and thus, have not taken any exams at the time of the experiment. This means, at
the time of the experiment, participants had not yet received prior information about their relative
success in their cohort at NHH yet. In the experiment, first an intelligence test is administered,
and then each participant is asked to guess the share of participants that performed better than
them. Participants are told that if their guess is correct, they receive a bonus of 80 NOK (approx.
$10) in addition to their show-up fee. Following this, they are informed that they have the chance
to learn their true rank and revise their previous guess accordingly. Revising the guess based on
true information about their rank guarantees that they receive the 80 NOK bonus at the end. At
this stage, participants face the choice whether they want to receive the information or not. In one
treatment, Costly Avoidance, receiving information is costless and while participants would have
to pay to avoid information. In the second treatment, Costly Information, participants must pay to
receive information while avoiding is costless. In both treatments, participants are asked to state
their Willingness to Pay (WTP, henceforth) for their choice to be implemented. By using this, we
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can measure WTP for avoidance in the Costly Avoidance treatment, and WTP for Information in
the Costly Information treatment.
Our results from the first experiment show that half of the participants avoid learning their
relative rank even when it is costly to avoid information. We observe high demand for avoidance
of ego related information. However, neither overconfidence nor certainty about the guess are
significantly correlated with information choice. High shares of positive payers for both avoidance
and information indicates that in such decisions people may have substantial behavioral noise.
This makes it difficult to reach a clear conclusion about Ego Utility and information choice. To
clarify the results of Ego Utility, based on the results of the first study, we conduct a second study,
Neutral Information.
The Neutral Information experiment is identical to the Ego Utility experiment, with one
main difference: information is about a randomly drawn number instead of the rank in an intel-
ligence test. Information is neutral because it is not related to any individual ability or success.
The Neutral Information experiment functions as a control for the WTP measures in the Ego Util-
ity experiment. If the demand for information and avoidance stem from the behavioral noise that
people have, we expect to see similar results in the second study. By comparing these two studies,
we are trying to disentangle the effects of ego Utility from the behavioral noise that can be seen
in both studies. In total of 399 undergraduate students participated in the second experiment in
October 2019. The second experiment was conducted a year after the first experiment with first
year students at the time.
Results from the second experiment show lower avoidance from Neutral Information com-
pared to ego-related information. However, a substantial share of people still avoid information
even when it is about a randomly drawn number. A higher proportion of participants chose to re-
ceive neutral information. The demand to receive information responds to the value of information
in this experiment; demand for high value information is higher than demand for low value infor-
mation. Comparing these two experiments provides evidence that demand for information reacts
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to the value of neutral information whereas with ego related information, self-image concerns play
an important role and lead to higher avoidance. Overall, findings from these two experiments show
that when calculating WTP for information choice, people may have behavioral noise. However,
despite the noise in behavioral measures, we document higher demand for information avoidance
when information is ego related.
In this paper, the design of our first experiment enables us to investigate the relation between
overconfidence and information choice. Overconfidence is extensively investigated in the previous
literature. It has been shown that overconfidence motivates decisions to compete or not and causes
significant variations through gender (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). We focus on the relation
between overconfidence and information preferences. This relation is investigated in different as-
pects in the previous literature. Particular questions that have attracted researchers’ attention focus
on how people process information regarding their abilities and what kind of biases could emerge.
When the information challenges existing beliefs, people may process the information in a biased
manner or they may choose to avoid information if they are given the chance to do so. Evidence
from economic experiments show that people process information in a self-serving way to pre-
serve self-confidence (Möbius et al., 2011), they update their beliefs when faced with both bad
and good news to strengthen confidence (Coutts, 2019), and they are less responsive to informa-
tion about their own personal traits (Buser et al., 2018). Different from these studies, we investigate
whether confidence can shape preferences over information by motivating people to choose what
to learn and what information to avoid. Our results show that confidence does not significantly
affect information preferences. However, certainty about one’s own guess significantly decreases
the likelihood of positive WTP to avoid information. These findings extend the previous literature
by showing that even though how successful people think they are is not highly effective, the more
certain they are about their guess the lower is the likelihood to pay any positive amount to avoid
information.
We use a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM, henceforth) auction in the experiment to elicit
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true WTP for information and avoidance (Becker et al., 1964). In this mechanism, it is the domi-
nant strategy to truthfully reveal the willingness to pay for a good or information. If the willingness
to pay is higher than a randomly drawn price, the player wins the auction and vice-versa. BDM is
one of the commonly used methods to reveal true WTP for a good or a decision. Comparing the
effects of ego related information to neutral information enables us to show how WTP is affected
by ego utility. Our results from these two experiments contribute to the usage of the BDM mecha-
nism in information choices when information is ego related or neutral. We provide evidence that
there is behavioral noise in such scales. However, WTP measured in a BDM-like mechanism still
responds to the type of utility which shows that the measurement errors may stem from behavioral
noise that is observed in individual decisions.
In section 2 we document the details of the design and results of first experiment, Ego
Utility, and in section 3 documents the second experiment, Neutral Information.
3.2 Ego Utility and Information
In this section, we describe the first of the two experiments that we cover in this paper: Ego Utility.
Our main goal is to investigate whether preferences over ego related information are influenced
by factors such as overconfidence, certainty and monetary rewards. For this reason, we varied the
costly information choice—receiving or avoiding information—in one treatment variation.
In subsection 2.1, we document the details of the design, in subsection 2.2 we cover the
information about the procedure and sample, and in 2.3, we document the findings from the Ego
Utility experiment.
3.2.1 Experimental Design
In this experiment, we aim to measure willingness to pay to receive or to avoid information on
one’s own relative intelligence. Learning one’s own relative intelligence could be detrimental to
self-image in case the results do not meet the expectations. Yet, the information can also increase
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participants’ earnings in the experiment. Therefore, we introduce a trade-off between monetary
utility and potentially undesirable information.
First, participants take an IQ test that is taken from a larger test and contains 25 progressive
Raven-style Matrices in total.1 The original time for completing the test is 10 minutes however
participants in our experiment are given 8 minutes to complete all the questions. Participants are
informed that the test is different from the original test and the accuracy of the IQ measurement
might not be very high. During the test, it is possible to go back and forth and change answers.
Participants are instructed to solve as many matrice-tasks as possible in 8 minutes. After taking
the test, they are asked to guess their rank compared to their peers in the same session. If their
guess is correct (±5) they win 80 NOK. 2 After making their guesses, participants are randomly
assigned to one of two treatments: Costly Information and Costly Avoidance. In these treatment
variations, the default information setting is either receiving (Costly Avoidance) or not receiving
(Costly Information) information. After being informed about whether they must pay to receive
or to avoid information, participants are asked to state whether they want to learn the information
on their true relative rank or not. If their preference is different from the default setting of the
treatment, they must pay an amount for that decision to be implemented. In both treatments we
use a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) (Becker et al., 1964) auction to measure willingness to
pay (WTP) for implementation of the participants’ information choice. We use the BDM auction
to elicit participants’ true information preferences and WTP for that to be implemented. All par-
ticipants receive 50 NOK that they can use in the BDM auction. Then they are are asked to submit
how much they would be willing to pay for their decision (receiving/avoiding information) to be
implemented. Each participant can submit a price between 0 and 50 NOK. The submitted price is
compared to a randomly drawn game price in the next stage and if the submitted WTP is higher,
the participant pays the price, and learns the true rank. If the auction is lost, the participant do not
1The intelligence test is taken from a longer test (https://openpsychometrics.org/printable/) and the original time is
10 minutes instead of 8 minutes.
2They are asked to guess ’What percentage of the participants in the same room at that moment performed better
than them?’ by entering a number between 0 and 100. 80 NOK was approximately 9 Euros at the time of the experiment.
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learn anything about their rank, and they can keep the 50 NOK bonus payment. If the participant
gets the information (with or without choosing it) they have the chance to revise their guess based
on the correct rank information. At the end of the game they will receive an extra payment from
their guess (0 NOK or 80 NOK) and the rest of the bonus payment after BDM results (see Figure
3.1).
The BDM mechanism allows us to elicit preferences toward information since it enables
us to capture variations in the WTP for their decisions to be implemented. Participants are given
the chance to enter “0” if they want to implement the default setting. By entering the maximum
amount, “50” they ensure that their decision is implemented. The best strategy in such a mecha-
nism is to enter their “true” WTP (Becker et al., 1964; Karni, 2009). Note that participants who
received information are shown the percentage who performed better than them as the fraction
of total number of participants in the same room at that session. By doing so we aim to prevent
information being more hurtful than aimed. Since in some cases participants show willingness to
avoid information but not sufficiently high to make it be implemented, we aimed for less hurtful
information by showing only relative performance instead of intelligence scores.
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Taking a General Intelligence Test
Guess
Random Assignment to Treatments
T1: Costly Information















Figure 3.1: Ego Utility Experiment
Note: In this experiment, people decide whether to receive or avoid information about their relative per-
formance in an intelligence test. In T1: Costly Information, they are told that they have to pay and they
have to incur a monetary cost if they choose to receive the information whereas avoidance is free. In T2:
Costly Avoidance, they have to incur a cost if they choose to avoid information whereas information is free.
Receiving the information guarantees earning the 80 NOK bonus. To elicit people’s willingness to receive
and avoid information we use a BDM auction. After final payoffs are realized, a post-experiment took place
to elicit demographics and other covariates.
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3.2.2 Sample and Procedures
405 first year undergraduate students at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) partici-
pated in a total of 7 sessions. The experiment is programmed in Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made
Economic Experiments (Z-tree) (Fischbacher, 2007) and participants are recruited via Expmo-
tor (Sørensen, 2011) (participant interface can be seen in Appendix B). Prior to data collection,
we registered a pre-analysis plan with a detailed description of our hypotheses with AEA RCT
Registry (Ay and Meißner, 2018).
After entering the room, participants are randomly placed in the booths that prevent them
seeing each other’s monitors. Instructions and consent are given both verbally and on the monitor.
All the participants are randomly assigned to one of the treatments within each session.
At the time of the experiment, first year undergraduate students have taken only one oblig-
atory course and they have not received any grades yet. This means, they did not have course
grades to compare themselves with their peers. This enables us to eliminate some factors that
might indicate people’s relative success or intelligence compare to their peers. We recruited first
year students who have been admitted to NHH, one of the most selective business schools in Nor-
way. This might be self-evident about their success and intelligence while not knowing their exact
relative situation compared to their cohort. In the experiment, a total of 8 minutes is given to com-
plete 25 questions. In the original version, the test is 10 minutes long, however we reduce the time
to create uncertainty with time pressure which reduces the risk that beliefs are either on the upper
or lower ends of the distribution.3 By doing so, we aim to have variation in the guess on how well
they did and the certainty about the guess. Our sample is not comparable to the general population
since they are successful and competitive undergraduate students in a selective business school.
Moreover, we manipulated the time given in the intelligence test, which makes the results of this
test not comparable to the other samples that took the test.
Table 3.1 summarizes the descriptives of the sample. The majority of participants are male
3We report the progress in the test in terms of number of people seeing the questions and answering correctly in
Appendix A.1.
Chapter 3 127
Essays on Information Preferences and Morality
(65%) and the average age is 20.5. As can be seen, our sample is well balanced in terms of ob-
servable characteristics. In the post-experiment questionnaire we ask people how likely they are
to take risk in general on a scale from 0 to 10. The average score for willingness to take risk is
5.4 and the sample is well-balanced in terms of self-reported risk preferences. Participants in this
experiment answered 8 questions correctly on average. This does not vary across treatments.
3.2.3 Results
In this section we document the results from the Ego Utility experiment. We start by reporting
the findings on the WTP for information and for avoidance. We find a positive WTP for both
avoiding (23.7, sd.=14.8) and receiving (29.7, sd.=14.5) information (see Figure 3.2). However, the
average WTP to receive information is significantly higher than WTP to avoid (p < 0.001). 90%
of the participants in the Costly Avoidance treatment entered a positive WTP to avoid information
whereas this share is 95% to receive information in the Costly Information treatment.
Result 1: The willingness to pay for both, information and avoidance, is positive.
Both, information and avoidance, are valued by a substantial share of participants. For this
valuation to be reasonable, we hypothesized that information and avoidance should be preferred
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Ego Utility
Costly Avoid Costly Info
N=198 N=207
Gender:
Female 63 (31.8%) 80 (39.0%)
Male 135 (68.2%) 125 (61.0%)
Age 20.3 (1.41) 20.6 (1.99)
Risk 5.33 (1.93) 5.51 (1.83)
# of Correct Answers 8.10 (3.48) 8.23 (3.15)
Note: Standars errors are in parentheses. This table provides an overview of our sample in the Ego Utility
experiment. As can be seen, between two treatments we observe a statistically significant difference for
levels of Willingness to Pay and the share of participants who entered positive amounts.
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more when they are free. However we observe that this does not hold for either information or
avoidance.
One direct motivation for wanting to receive information is clear; it increases monetary
payoff.Information avoidance, however, is driven by more psychological motives; the information
could be detrimental to their ego by showing a low level of intelligence. Having both, a fraction of
positive payers and a positive average values of WTP in both treatments indicates that, participants
consider both the monetary and ego utility of information. The monetary value of information is
significantly valued at an higher level than the ego—self-image—effect. The distribution of WTP
for information and for avoidance can be seen in Figure 3.3. The value of information is determined
by participant’s subjective beliefs about their own rank; for a rational risk-neutral agent without
ego-utility, it is bounded by completely non-informed (uniform) priors, for which the value of
information is 47 NOK (the optimal WTP is 50). The treatments were intended to measure WTP
for information and ignorance separately by changing the default setting of the game. This feature
of the game makes these results not comparable between receiving and avoiding information.
Based on the previous literature, we hypothesized that the main motivation for information
avoidance might be image (ego utility) protection. According to previous research (Eil and Rao,













Figure 3.2: Average WTP for Information and Avoidance
Note: This figure shows the average WTPs for both information and avoidance.For avoidance the average
WTP is 23.7 (sd.=14.8) and for information it is 29.7 (sd.=14.5). This difference is significant (p < 0.001).
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information. If self-image is vulnerable, avoiding potentially hurtful information is preferable to
prevent one’s own ego being hurt. To measure how vulnerable their guess is, we asked partici-
pants how certain they are about the correctness of their guess on the relative performance. We
pre-specified that if the uncertainty about the guess is high, avoidance is preferable since the infor-
mation is potentially more hurtful. To explain WTP for information and avoidance, we document
results from an OLS regression in Table 3.2. The first variable we use in this table is “# of Ques-
tions Seen”. This variable is the number of questions that a participant saw in 8 minutes during
the intelligence test.the number of questions that a participant saw in 8 minutes dur- ing the intel-
ligence test. We introduce this variable as an indicator of the progress in the test, which is the only
signal for participants as well since they can only see how many questions they have answered and
not how many correct answers they had. In Table 3.2, the other variables are the guess on what
share of all participants performed better than them (between 0 and 100), how certain they are
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Figure 3.3: WTP for Information and Avoidance
Note: This figure shows the distribution of WTPs for both information and avoidance. As can be seen, a
higher share of participants state high WTP for information compared to WTPs for avoidance.
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the covariates have little explanatory power for the WTP for information and avoidance.
Result 2: The willingness to pay to receive and avoid information is not explained by
confidence and / or certainty about one’s own relative performance.
This result is in contradiction with the previous literature and our pre-registered hypotheses.
For example, Eil and Rao (2011) and Kőszegi (2006) show that information avoidance in case
of ego related tasks is driven by self-confidence. In our analysis we use guess about one’s own
Table 3.2: Willingness to pay
Dependent variable:
Willingness to Pay
Costly Info. Costly Avoid.
(1) (2)













Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Note: Standars errors are in parentheses. In this table, we show the WTP in relation with a group
of covariates. # of Quest. Seen shows the number of questions that are seen during the test. Guess
shows the guess on what share of all participants performed better than them. Certainty shows
the answer for the question "What are the chances that your guess is within 5% range of actual
share of participants that performed better than you?" on a scale between 0 and 100. Risk is the
self-reported risk preferences.
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relative performance and the certainty—how certain they are about their guess—as indicators
of confidence. We do not observe any significant relation between these variables and WTP for
information/avoidance. Even though our results document positive WTP for avoidance, behavioral
measures that are collected in our experiment do not explain the demand for avoidance.
Figure 3.4 shows the relation between the number of questions seen and a participant’s
guess on their relative performance. As can be seen in the figure, the number of questions they see
during the test is negatively related with the guess. This means that, as they see more questions,
they guess a lower share of participants performed better than them. We find this for both male
and female participants and does not vary by gender. This result can also be seen in Table 3.3.
Although the magnitude is small, the number of questions seen during the task is positively related
to a participant’s guess on how well they did in the test.
Result 3: Progress in the test is positively related with the guess on one’s own relative
performance. Participants, who see a higher number of questions tend to guess lower
Female Male
























Figure 3.4: Guess and Number of Questions Seen
Note: This figure shows how the guess on own’s rank in the intelligence test is related to the number of
questions they see in the experiment. We use the number of question seen as an indicator of performance
in the test, because participants do not see whether their answers were correct or not but only how many
questions they went through. Number of questions is the only indicator to have a perception of how well
they did in the test.
132 Chapter 3
Essays on Information Preferences and Morality
shares for people performed better than them.
Our findings show that people avoid information about their relative rank in an intelligence
test, even when they can earn higher monetary payoffs by receiving it and avoidance requires them
to incur a monetary cost. However, WTP for avoidance does not seem to be affected by the cost
of avoidance in terms of both WTP and share of avoiders. Our design closely follows the previous
literature on information avoidance and Ego Utility by introducing sensitive information about
one’s own relative intelligence. This information can potentially hurt ego by showing lower than
expected rankings if the self-esteem is fragile (Kőszegi, 2006; Kőszegi et al., 2019). Even though
we document that avoidance is preferred and individuals are willing to pay for it, we are not able
to explain it with their self-reported risk preferences, their guess on how well they did and how
certain they think the guess is correct. In the previous literature, female participants are shown
to have lower confidence. However, our results do not confirm these previous findings and we
do not observe any gender difference in the guess that they make about their own performance.
Although we do not have any behavioral measure to investigate this result further, this might be
Table 3.3: Guess on “What share of all participants performed better than you?”
Dependent variable:
Guess
(Costly Info.) (Costly Avoid.)




Gender (M)  0.033  0.019
(0.031) (0.028)
Observations 198 205
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Note: Standars errors are in parentheses. This table shows the estimation for the guess on how well they
performed in the task. As can be seen in the table, number of questions they see during the test has significant
effect on the guess only in one treatment.
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due to females being equally confident since they are in a selective school. This partially supports
the findings from Almås et al. (2016) who show there are very few differences between adolescent
boys and girls in Norway.
Overall, our results from the Ego Utility experiment show a high demand for information
and avoidance. This indicates that a behavioral noise exists when people make decisions over in-
formation collection. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate whether our finding that people avoid
potentially ego-relevant information is entirely driven by that noise. To that purpose, we conducted
a second experiment in which ego utility is not present and the information is not related to any
individual characteristics or ability. We provide findings from the Neutral Information experiment
in the following section. This second experiment provides us with measures for participants’ de-
mand for or avoidance of non-ego related, neutral information which allows us to see the effects
of ego utility on information choice.
3.3 Neutral Information and Information Preferences
After conducting the Ego Utility experiment, we decided to run an identical experiment with one
significant difference: information is neutral, that is does not concern any important personal or
social characteristics of people. If information avoidance is motivated by self-image concerns, then
people should be unwilling to avoid information that does not concern their self-image.
In the first subsection we present the details of our design, in the second subsection we give
information about procedures of the experiment and sample, and lastly in the third subsection we
report the findings from the Neutral Information experiment and compare Ego Utility and Neutral
Information.
3.3.1 Experimental Design
For neutral information, we use a random number as the content in this second experiment. People
choose whether they want to receive information on the randomly drawn number. As in the first
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experiment, this information can be used to increase monetary payouts from the experiment. We
introduce another variation in this experiment: The value of information. We vary the value by
having two different probabilities that the information will help the participants to increase their
earnings. Varying the earning from information enables us to see whether choice over information
and WTP for it to be implemented react to the monetary value of information. The mechanism we
are after is very simple: if the potential earnings from information is higher, demand and WTP for
it should be higher. By providing results on information preferences for Neutral Information we
aim to explain results from the Ego Utility experiment better.
Different from guessing their own rank in an intelligence test, we ask subjects to guess a
randomly generated number which is neither related to their performance nor their rank in the
intelligence test. If the motivation to avoid information is to protect self-image, such information
should not lead to a demand for avoidance. Our design aims to pin down two sources of infor-
mation preferences when the information has no effect on ego utility. The first one is the value of
information. We investigate it by introducing two different levels of value of receiving the informa-
tion. The second is the willingness to receive and avoid neutral information. To investigate these
two channels we used a 2⇥2 design in which the default settings on information (costly avoidance
and costly information) are combined with 2 levels of value of information; high and low. With this
design we aim to investigate avoidance and acquisition when neutral (not ego related) information
has a clear monetary value.
The experiment proceeds very similarly to the Ego Utility experiment which can be seen in
Figure 3.1. The design first differs on the “Guess” stage, where participants enter their guess on
their relative rank in the Ego Utility experiment. In the Neutral Information experiment participants
are informed that a random number between 1-9 is chosen by the computer and if they guess it
correctly they will earn an additional monetary payoff. As in the Ego Utility experiment, in the
“Certainty” stage people stated how certain they are about their guess on the random number.
We wanted to have this measure first to make the design identical to the Ego Utility experiment,
Chapter 3 135
Essays on Information Preferences and Morality
and second to see whether there is a difference on how accurate people think their guess is when
the content of information changes. In the Neutral Information experiment, in case of receiving
information about the randomly drawn number, participants are given the chance to update their
guess and earn the additional payoff, 80 NOK as in the Ego Utility experiment.
The information set in this experiment is different from the Ego Utility experiment, in case
of receiving information they see a set of numbers (2 or 4). All the participants are informed
that one of the numbers in this information set is the correct number. We manipulate the value of
information by changing how many numbers are shown in case of receiving the information. In
the high value treatment, participants are given the chance to see a set of 2 numbers and informed
that one of them is the randomly drawn number. In the low value treatment they can choose to see
a set of 4 numbers and are informed that one of them is the randomly drawn number. If they chose
to receive information they are shown the set of 2 (4) numbers and given chance to update their
guess. The manipulation on the value of information changes the likelihood of the revised guess
being correct.
The rest of the experiment follows Figure 3.1. Participants state their WTP out of 50 NOK
in a BDM auction for their information choice to be implemented. Although the interval and the
bonus are the same as in the Ego Utility experiment, here the value of information is different
both in terms of ego utility and monetary utility. In Neutral Information, the information does not
have any impact on ego utility because it is irrelevant to any individual information. In terms of
monetary utility, after receiving the information their updated guess may be correct with 50% or
25% chance whereas in the Ego Utility experiment the information is only about the exact rank and
the updated guess is correct with 100% chance. As in the Ego Utility, participants are randomly
assigned first to one of the two conditions; Costly Information and Costly Avoidance. After this
first variation they are assigned one of the two variations: high or low value information.
The design of the control experiment with Neutral Information closely follows our Ego
Utility experiment with the difference of information being neutral. This feature enables us to
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estimate the real size of the Ego Utility that we measured in the first experiment.
3.3.2 Sample and Procedure
We followed an almost identical procedure to the first experiment and registered a pre-analysis
plan with AEA RCT Registry prior to data collection (Ay and Meißner, 2019). As in the Ego
Utility experiment, first year students were invited to participate in the experiment before any
assignments and exams. Table 3.1 shows the descriptives of the data collected in the Neutral Infor-
mation experiment. As can be seen, our sample is well randomized across treatments. In terms of
observable characteristics and performance measures, our two samples (Ego Utility and Neutral
Information) are quite similar.
3.3.3 Results
The Neutral Information experiment focuses mainly on two dimensions of information prefer-
ences: value of information and avoidance vs. receiving information. We aim to investigate infor-
mation preferences when the information does not have any ego-relevant component. This design
enables us to document how preferences toward Neutral Information differ from preferences to-
ward ego related information.
We observe that the majority of participants entered positive WTP for information. For both
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Neutral Information
Costly Avoidhigh Costly Avoidlow Costly Infohigh Costly Infolow
N=102 N=104 N=97 N=96
Gender:
Female 39 (38.2%) 40 (39.6%) 40 (41.7%) 32 (33.3%)
Male 63 (61.8%) 61 (60.4%) 56 (58.3%) 64 (66.7%)
Age 20.6 (1.41) 20.4 (1.46) 20.6 (3.64) 20.7 (1.41)
Risk 6.64 (2.11) 6.56 (2.04) 6.19 (1.78) 6.76 (2.15)
Correct Answer 8.97 (2.36) 9.32 (2.07) 8.61 (1.98) 8.83 (2.24)
Note: Standars errors are in parentheses. This table provides an overview of our sample in the Neutral
Information experiment. As can be seen, our sample is quite similar to the one in the Ego Utility experiment
in terms of demographics, score and risk behavior. Between treatments we observe a statistically significant
difference for levels of Willingness to Pay and the share of participants who entered positive amounts.
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high and low value information, 93.8% of the participants entered a positive amount for WTP
to receive information (see Figure 3.1). This result is partly expected since we hypothesized that
when the information has no effect on ego and has monetary value it should be demanded on
a higher level. For the same reason, we expected almost all the participants to enter a positive
WTP to receive information. However, our findings show that approximately 6% of participants
did not enter a positive amount. Although we do not observe any difference between information
value treatments on the share of participants who are willing to pay a positive amount for the
information, we observe a significant change in the average WTP. The WTP for information reacts
to the value of information in the hypothesized way: when information has high value (seeing 2
numbers) average WTP (28.2, sd.=13.4) is significantly higher than when the information has low
value (seeing 4 numbers, 24.5, sd.=12.3, p = 0.013).
For avoidance, our findings deviate from our pre-registered hypotheses. High shares of peo-
ple are willing to pay a positive amount to avoid information in both treatments. When the in-















Figure 3.1: Share of Positive WTP
Note: Bars are standard errors. In this figure, we report the share of participants who avoided information
by treatments. We observe a high share of participants for both choosing avoidance and information.
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(4 numbers are shown) 82.7% of the participants entered positive WTP to avoid information. Al-
though we expected to capture the behavioral noise that people have when making decisions over
information, we did not hypothesize avoidance from Neutral Information to be as high as in our
results. In Figure 3.2, we report the average WTPs for information and avoidance. We do not ob-
serve any effect of value of information on WTP to avoid information. WTP to avoid high value
information (13.9, sd.=13) is not significantly different from WTP for low value information (14.8,
sd.=11.8, p= 0.29). This might suggest that the willingness to pay a positive amount for avoidance
is mostly behavioral noise and is not driven by any feature of the information.
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of WTP by treatments for the Neutral Information experi-
ment. As can be seen, WTP for information in both high and low values condition is much higher
compared to WTP for avoidance. The difference in WTP to receive high and low value information
is clear in the figure. This difference is not observed for avoidance.
Result 1: WTP to receive information increases when the value of information is












Figure 3.2: Average WTPs for Information and Avoidance
Note: In this figure, we report the average WTPs for both avoidance and information. We compare WTPs
for high and low value information. For avoidance, on the one hand, average WTP does not vary by the
value of information (p = 0.29). On the other hand, for information we observe significantly higher WTP
when the value is high (p = 0.013).
Chapter 3 139
Essays on Information Preferences and Morality
This result shows that demand for neutral information responds to the value of informa-
tion whereas demand for avoidance does not vary. In this experiment motivation for avoidance
is not clear since the information is about a random number rather than any personal attributes.
This finding suggests that people have a substantial behavioral noise when making decisions over
information in a BDM auction.
When these findings are compared to ego related information although the level of WTP to
avoid is lower, we find that the majority of participants enter positive amounts in both cases. If
the measured levels of WTP in the Ego Utility experiment reflects only ego utility, we would not
see high shares of positive payers avoiding neutral information. Based on the findings from the
Neutral Information experiment, our results suggest that the scales that are used to measure Ego
Utility might contain substantial noise. BDM auctions are commonly used for such measures and
theoretically lead subjects to enter their true preferences since the dominant strategy is entering
one’s own valuation. WTPs that are measured with BDM, enable us to see the difference between
neutral information and ego utility and the findings suggest that if this mechanism is used only for
one of these, measures might capture more channels than Ego Utility.
Avoidance (high) Avoidance (low) Information (high) Information (low)











Figure 3.3: Distribution of WTP by treatments
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Table 3.2 aims to find determinants of WTP to receive and to avoid neutral information.
Each column of the table refers to one treatment in the experiment. In the fourth column, when the
information has low value males enter significantly lower WTPs. However neither the magnitude
nor the sign of the gender variable is constant across treatments. Other than that we do not observe
a significant relation with any of the covariates.
In the previous literature it is shown that individuals demand “useless” information which
has no instrumental value to feel good about themselves (Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006).4 In some cases
receiving information could be preferred if the information signals positive attributes of oneself,
such as high intelligence. Avoiding information that does not contain anything potentially hurtful
has not been a topic of interest in behavioral economics. This is partly due to the problem of ratio-
Table 3.2: Regressions of WTA and WTP on sitation variables in the Control Experiment
Dependent variable:
Willingness to Pay
Costly Avoidhigh Costly Avoidlow Costly Infohigh Costly Infolow
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of Quest. Seen 0.390 0.388 0.539⇤  0.150
(0.290) (0.284) (0.313) (0.271)
Risk  0.561 0.418 0.941 0.053
(0.791) (0.734) (0.853) (0.670)
Gender (M) 4.972  2.626 1.839  7.200⇤⇤
(2.994) (2.983) (3.251) (3.307)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 102 100 96 96
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Note: Standars errors are in parentheses. Control variables are the unobserved self-reported characteristics
that are collected in the post-experiment survey. It includes self-reported general success, intelligence and
importance of intelligence with demographics.
4In this paper, individuals demand to learn how they performed in an intelligence test even when there is no
monetary gain. The authors argue that this is to satisfy Ego Utility.
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nalizing such behavior. In psychology, however, some research documented that uncertainty can
give pleasure. Wilson et al. (2005) provide experimental evidence that after good news, avoiding
information could extend the positive feelings. Wilson et al. (2013) argue that uncertainty could
make “thrill” persist longer which can lead to avoidance. Sunstein (2019) describes this situation
as “ruining” the joy by revealing information. Our experiment does not document any of these
channels, yet we find it valuable to note as potential motivations to avoid neutral information.
Our findings provide a weak evidence for the motivations for information avoidance. We are
unable to explain avoidance of neutral information with any mechanism that we have in the exper-
iment. However, we define this as a behavior that stems from the noise in the individual choices.
People may fail to choose the best option in terms of monetary outcome or ego utility, and they
might have some random utility from making other, even dominated, alternatives (Luce, 1959).
This means, when people are given the alternatives, some may always choose the options that are
not the dominant ones. In both Ego Utility and Neutral Information experiments, we gave people
the chance to use the BDM scale to state their preference only on one direction—receiving or
avoiding information. At this point, we continue our analysis by considering the WTP measures
that we collected in the Ego Utility experiment may contain a substantial amount of behavioral
noise due to use of the scale which is constrained to only positive numbers. Incentives are similar
in both experiments, which means similar behavioral noise might be the reason for the hetero-
geneity in WTP for avoidance in the Neutral Information experiment as well. By comparing the
effects of the ego utility and image concerns with the effects of random utility, we show that
despite the behavioral noise in both experiments, being exposed to ego related information and
self-image concerns increases the demand for information avoidance. Even if some part of the
WTP for avoidance in the Ego Utility experiment stems from the behavioral noise and not the con-
cerns about self-image, we aim to capture the part that is caused by self-image concerns with this
comparison. We use a regression analysis for such comparison in which we show the effects of be-
ing in the Ego Utility experiment on WTP and then the interaction between being in the Ego Utility
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experiment and in the Costly Avoidance treatment. By using such specification, we expect to have
an increasing effect of being in the Ego Utility experiment and in the Costly Avoidance treatment
on WTP if the concerns about self-image are effective in the Ego Utility experiments. Our analysis
captures the diff-in-diff effects of two experiments and avoidance treatments. Another benefit of
using such model is to capture any differences between two samples in our to experiments.
We report this analysis in table 3.3. The first column of Table 3.3 shows the analysis with-
out control variables. In this column the positive effect of being in the Ego Utility experiment is
highly significant and can be seen in the first row. “Ego⇥Avoidance” variable captures the effect
of Ego Utility on WTP for avoidance. As can be seen, facing a trade off between Ego Utility and
monetary gains is related to a significantly higher WTP to avoid information compared to the in-
formation that is neutral—not ego related—and about a randomly drawn number. This shows a
higher demand for avoidance in the Ego Utility experiment.
Result 2: When the information is about the relative rank in the intelligence test, WTP
to avoid information is higher compared to WTP to avoid Neutral Information.
This result clarifies our findings by showing that even though people avoid both, ego relevant
and random information, the willingness to pay to avoid ego relevant information is higher. Our
results for the Neutral Information experiment shows that when faced with similar scales people
may have behavioral noise, and the measured WTP for information choice might be driven by
various factors. However, even with the noise, ego utility is stronger than “random utility” in the
Neutral Information experiment and leads to higher WTP to avoid information.
3.4 Conclusion
In many social and economic decisions beliefs about one’s own abilities play an important role.
For example decisions on what to study, which career path to follow, which tasks to sign up for
are all based on one’s perception of own abilities and skills. Evidence from economic theory and
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experiments show that these beliefs are important to people and when they receive information
about their own abilities, they tend to process it in a biased manner (Karlsson et al., 2009; Kőszegi,
2006; Kőszegi et al., 2019; Eil and Rao, 2011; Buser et al., 2018; Möbius et al., 2011). If the
information shows lower abilities than expected, it might be detrimental to ego. In this paper, we
show that when there is a chance of receiving “bad news”, people choose to avoid information
about their abilities even when that means that they do not receive a monetary reward. Our results
show that people avoid information about their relative intelligence and they are willing to forego
Table 3.3: Overall effect of Ego Utility on WTP
Dependent variable:
Willingness to Pay
(Without Controls) (With Controls)













Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Note: Standars errors are in parentheses. This table shows the relation between Ego Utility and WTP for
the decision on information to be implemented. As can be seen, being in the Ego Utility experiment has an
increasing effect on the WTP by itself. Effects of being in the Ego Utility experiment and in the Avoidance
treatment are captured by the interaction term Ego⇥Avoidance. As can be seen, WTP to avoid information
is significantly higher in the Ego Utility experiment compared to Neutral Information. The first column
of the table shows this analysis without controlling for gender and self-reported risk whereas the second
column shows the results when controlling for those two covariates. In the second column 7 observation is
lost due to absence of responses to control questions.
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monetary gains to do so.
Contrary to the previous experiments, we do not find an association between confidence
and information preferences. Instead, we provide evidence in favor of no relationship between in-
formation avoidance, guess about own performance and certainty about this guess. In the second
experiment, we investigate whether avoidance is solely motivated by Ego Utility. Our results show
that a high fraction of participants avoid information even when it is not ego related and even when
avoidance means foregoing higher monetary payoffs. We find that WTP to receive information is
positively associated to the value of information, whereas this relationship is not present for avoid-
ance. Overall, the findings from the second experiment show that people may avoid information
even when it has no effect on ego utility—self-image. This indicates that behavioral noise has
some impact on people’s decisions on whether they want to pay to avoid information.
Taken together, the two experiments show that people are willing to pay to avoid information
in settings in which this protects their self-image and in settings in which it does not. This finding
suggests that it is not easy to interpret participants’ demand for information avoidance in the first
experiment as purely driven by self-image protection, as it indicates that part of the demand is
due to behavioral noise. However, the comparison of the WTP to avoid in the first experiment to
the second experiment shows that participants in the Ego Utility experiment are willing to pay
significantly more to avoid information. This points to the conclusion that ego utility does in fact
at least partially explain participants’ willingness to pay in the first experiment.
In this paper, we document findings on avoidance of ego related information. Our findings
are relevant to many economic and social decisions that require processing information about
abilities and skills such as education and career choices. We show that no matter how confident
the people are, they avoid receiving information about their intelligence. Our findings contribute
to the understanding of information preferences which in real life can cause inefficiencies.
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Figure 3.A.2: Progress of the IQ Test in Neutral Information
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Abstract: The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a devastating global health crisis. 
Without a vaccine or effective medication, the best hope for mitigating virus 
transmission is collective behavior change and support for public health interventions 
(e.g., spatial distancing, physical hygiene, and endorsement of health policies). In a 
large-scale international collaboration (N = 46,769 across 67 countries), we 
investigated why people adopted public health behaviors and endorsed public policy 
interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the pandemic (April-May, 
2020). Results revealed that respondents who identified more strongly with their 
nation consistently reported engagement in public health behaviors and greater 
support for public health policies. We also found a small effect of political orientation, 
suggesting that left-wing individuals were more likely to endorse public health 
behaviors and support for public health measures than right-wing individuals. We 
discuss the implications of links between national identity, leadership, and public 
health for managing the COVID-19 and future pandemics. 
Keywords: COVID-19, national identity, public health, pandemic, human 
development 
  






As of December 2020, more than 64 million people worldwide have been 
infected by the new coronavirus and more than 1.4 million have died,1 making the 
COVID-19 pandemic one of the greatest health crises of the past century. Until a 
vaccine or effective medical treatment is administered, the public response to the 
current pandemic is largely limited to policy-making and collective behavior change 
(Lewnard & Lo, 2020). To reduce virus transmission it is crucial that people engage 
in public health behavior (e.g., maintain spatial distance and improve physical 
hygiene) and support COVID-19 protective policies (e.g., limiting travel and closing 
bars and restaurants). And even after effective vaccines are administered, it will be 
critical to convince people to take them. This is why the Director of the World Health 
Organization recently argued: “That’s why behavioural science is so important – it 
helps us to understand how people make decisions, so we can support them to 
make the best decisions for their health” (WHO, 2020). In the current investigation, 
we respond to this call for behavioral science and present the results from a global 
study across 67 countries, testing key predictors of public health support.  
What drives people to support public health initiatives during a pandemic? 
Answering this question may help countries, health organizations, and political 
leaders develop effective interventions to increase compliance with actions such as 
maintaining spatial distance and restricting travel (Van Bavel et al., 2020). 
Governments can coordinate individuals and help them avoid behaviors no longer 
considered socially responsible. However, recent evidence suggests this type of 
leadership requires cultivating a shared sense of solidarity to increase compliance 
with recommended health behaviors (Biddlestone, Greene, & Douglas, 2020; 
Haslam et al., 2011; Martinez-Brawley & Gualda, 2020). Solidarity with other 
members of one’s group is a component of ingroup identification (Leach et al., 2008), 
that is the personal significance that being part of a nation holds for an individual 
(Cameron, 2004; Leach et al., 2008; Postmes et al., 2012; Tajfel, 1978). Identifying 
with a group is associated with mutual cooperation and adherence to norms (e.g., 
Brewer, 1999; Buchan et al., 2011; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999), motivation to help 
other members of their group (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Levine, Prosser, 
Evans, & Reicher, 2005), and willingness to engage in collectively-oriented actions 
aimed at improving the group’s welfare (Bilewicz & Wójcik, 2010; Klandermans, 
2002; Tajfel, 1978; van Zomeren et al., 2008). We reasoned that national identities, 
in particular, might play a key role in promoting public health in the current pandemic 
(see Van Bavel et al., 2020). 
 
1  These figures were reported by the World Health Organization: 
www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019 




National identity plays an important role in motivating people to engage in  
greater civic involvement (Huddy & Khatib, 2007) and costly behaviors that benefit 
other members of their national community (Kalin & Sambanis, 2018). Accordingly, a 
strong sense of shared national identity might help promote collective efforts to 
combat the pandemic within a country (e.g., Dovidio et al.,2020). Moreover, border 
closures, travel bans, and national task forces have likely made national identities 
even more salient during the pandemic (Bieber, 2020). The existence and activation 
of strong collective identities can allow political leaders to mobilize large populations 
to adhere to emergency public health measures. For instance, political leaders and 
public health officials often foster a sense that “we are in this together” and that we 
can manage the crisis through collective action (Gkinopoulos & Hegarty, 2018; van 
Zomeren et al., 2008). This might be particularly important since partisanship and 
polarization within countries can reduce health behavior and increase the risk for 
infections and mortality (Gadarian, Goodman, Pepinsky, 2020; Gollwitzer, Martel, 
Brady, Pärnamets, Freedman, Knowles, & Van Bavel, 2020; Van Bavel et al., 2020). 
However, recent work in the United States has found that threats to national identity 
can lead to less support for public health initiatives (Kachanoff et al., 2020).  
The goal of the current paper is to examine whether national identification 
explains global adherence to the collective health measures during a pandemic 
(Haslam, 2020; Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Jetten et al., 2020). We examined the 
associations between the strength of identification with one’s nation and whether 
people adopted public health behaviors (e.g., spatial distancing, hand washing) and 
endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants). Prior work 
suggests these actions could substantially reduce the number of COVID-19 
infections (Block et al., 2020; Ferguson, 2006; Koo et al., 2020; Lewnard & Lo, 
2020). Our primary hypothesis is that people who identify strongly with their nation 
will, on average, express stronger support for public health measures than those 
who identify less with their nation. 
National identity is distinct from beliefs about national superiority (e.g., Huddy 
& Del Ponte, 2019; Kosterman & Feshbach 1989; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006). 
The latter has been conceptualized as national narcissism: a belief in the greatness 
of one’s nation that is unappreciated by others (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, 
Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). National identity tends to correlate positively with 
national narcissism because they both assume a positive evaluation of one’s nation. 
However, they predict different outcomes. For example, outgroup prejudice is 
negatively associated with national identification but positively with national 
narcissism (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). Research also finds that 
collective narcissism is associated with frustrated individual needs, such that people 
high in collective narcissism are especially concerned with how their group reflects 
on them (Cichocka, 2016). National narcissism then predicts greater preoccupation 
with maintaining a positive image of the nation than with the well-being of fellow 
citizens (Cislak et al., 2018; Marchlewska et al., 2020). Thus, national narcissists 
may be less inclined to engage in behaviors to prevent the spread of COVID-19--or 
even acknowledge the risks associated with the pandemic in their home country 
(Nowak et al., 2020). Therefore, in predicting compliance with public health 
measures, we sought to distinguish national identification from national narcissism.   




In addition, there is some evidence right-wing political ideology is associated 
with both national identity (e.g., van der Toorn, Nail, Liviatan & Jost, 2014) and 
national narcissism (e.g., Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, & Olechowski, 
2016; Cislak et al., 2018; Marchlewska, Cichocka, Panayiotou, Castellanos, & 
Batayneh, 2018). Moreover, supporters of right-wing political parties have tended to 
downplay risks associated with COVID-19 (e.g., Calvillo et al., 2020; Capraro & 
Barcelo, 2020; Sjåstad & Van Bavel, 2020) and were less likely to comply with 
preventative measures compared to left-leaning or liberal individuals (van Holm et 
al., 2020; Capraro & Barcelo, 2020). For that reason, we differentiated the effects of 




The COVID-19 pandemic is a truly global crisis with over 200 countries 
reporting infections. To understand the variables that account for public health 
support around the globe, we launched a collaborative, international project in April 
2020 collecting large-scale data from as many nations as possible. We collected a 
large sample consisting of citizens from 67 countries (n =  46,769; see Figure 1). 
See Methods for details about the sample.  
We analysed the data using multi-level models, which allows us to account for 
country-level variation in economic, political and health measures while examining 
whether national identification predicted public health support. We modeled country-
level factors, such as the Human Development Index (HDI)2 to examine whether the 
impact of person-level factors, like national identification, would predict public health 
support, including after adjusting for the general health and standard of living in a 
country (see Methods for details and sample items). We also adjusted for the 
COVID-19 infection and mortality rates within each country to ensure that public 
health support was not merely a function of local risks. Due to the large sample size, 
we focused our interpretations on findings that were highly statistically significant (p 
< .001). 
Our results provide robust evidence that national identification is a reliable 
predictor of all three forms of public health support measured in our survey: self-
reported spatial distancing, physical hygiene, and policy support. Citizens who 
identified more strongly with their nation reported greater support for critical public 
health measures, even after adjusting for national narcissism and political ideology 
(as well as the country-level Human Development Index and local rates of COVID-19 
infections and mortality). Right-wing participants reported lower levels of support for 
all three protective measures than left-wing participants. National narcissism was 
only weakly, albeit positively, related to support for two measures: physical hygiene 
and policy support. In sum, the results provide clear evidence that national 
identification is related to public health support across national and cultural contexts. 
 
2 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a measure of achievement in key dimensions of human 
development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and having a decent standard of living. 
The HDI is the mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions (see 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi). 




Figure 1. Map of the 67 participating countries and territories with sample size scaled to 





Participants generally reported following the guidelines for contact and 
hygiene and they supported policies that were intended to reduce the impact of 
COVID-19 (i.e., means for all three measures were above 8, on scales ranging from 
0 to 10; see Table 1). The public health measures were all highly correlated with one 
another (Pearson’s rs > .38). Consistent with prior work, national identification was 
positively correlated with both national narcissism (r = .38) and right-wing political 
ideology (r = .18). 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics and multi-level correlations for person-level measures. The 
mean score for each scale is presented along with the variance explained within and 
between participants and the scale reliability (alpha). This is no alpha for ideology since it is 
a one-item measure. Higher scores reflect greater support for each measure (and stronger 
right-wing political beliefs in the case of ideology). 
    Variance   Correlations  
  Mean  Between Within Alpha 2 3 4 5 6 
1.Spatial 
distancing 8.61 .21 2.13 .74 
.43 .44 .02 .15 -.02 
2. Physical 
hygiene 8.21 .47 2.31 .72 
  .38 .12 .17 .02 





support 8.29 .94 3.45 .81 
    .06 .13 -.03 
4. National 
narcissism 5.36 2.18 4.89 .82 
      .38 .27 
5. National 
identification 8.04 .83 4.00 .72 
        .18 
6. Political 
ideology 4.99 .37 5.03  NA 
          
 
 
For all measures, except political ideology, there were negative relationships 
between HDI scores and country-level means (see Table 2). In other words, citizens 
in countries with higher scores on the global Human Development Index also 
reported less support for two of our COVID-19 public health measures. However, we 
should note that our dataset includes data from very few African countries, many of 
which have relatively low HDI scores but seem thus far to have fared better in the 
pandemic than higher-HDI countries (see Ghosh, Bernstein, & Mersha, 2020).3  
 
Table 2: Relationships between HDI (Human Development Index) scores and means of 
person-level variables. T-ratios and variance provide the test statistic and the percentage of 
variance explained for each variable. 
 
Measure HDI t-ratio Variance 
Spatial distancing -.13 2.59 8% 
Physical hygiene -.40*  4.98 34% 
Policy support -.59* 5.81 37% 
National narcissism -.94* 6.39 11% 
 
3 Although it is beyond the scope of the current paper, future research should examine whether 
people in less developed countries indeed placed a greater faith in their political and medical 
institutions during the early stages of the pandemic, or whether they were motivated to simply report 
higher compliance with governmental guidelines. 




National identity -.52* 7.33 31% 
Political ideology -.12 1.44 2% 
Note: * p < .001 
 
As seen in Table 3, national identification was the strongest predictor of all 
three COVID-19 public health support measures (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 for the 
coefficients in each country). It was significantly and positively related to all three 
measures (even after adjusting for national narcissism and political ideology). 
Individuals with stronger national identification (relative to other people within their 
own nation) reported stronger support for increasing spatial distance and improving 
physical hygiene than individuals with weaker identification, and they also endorsed 
COVID-19 public health policies to a greater extent.  
 
Table 3. Relations between outcomes and predictors (including the slope and t-ratio of each 
relationship). National identification was the strongest predictor of all three COVID-19 public 
health support measures. 
 
Outcome Predictor Slope t-ratio 
Spatial 
distancing 
National narcissism -.006 < 1 
  National 
identification 
.128* 8.49 
  Political ideology -.027* 4.31 
Physical 
hygiene 
National narcissism .060* 6.40 
  National 
identification 
.124* 11.24 
  Political ideology -.015 1.89 
Policy support National narcissism .029* 2.82 




  National 
identification 
.127* 10.30 
  Political ideology -.050* 4.72 
Note: * p < .001 
 
National narcissism was significantly positively related to two of the three 
protective measures (albeit weakly). Individuals scoring higher in national narcissism 
supported physical hygiene and COVID-19 policies more strongly compared to 
individuals with lower levels of national narcissism. The relations between political 
ideology and public health support were negative (albeit weakly) for two of the 
outcome measures, indicating that individuals with more left-leaning or liberal 
political orientation tended to support spatial distancing and COVID-19 policies more 
strongly than those with more right-leaning or conservative political orientation. 
Taken together, the three predictors accounted for 8% of the person-level variance 
of the contact measure, for 7% of the person-level variance of the hygiene measure, 




Figure 2. Relation between collective concerns and public health measures in 67 countries 
and territories. Heat index depicts the slope coefficients in each country. Blueish colors 
mean negative associations between our predictors and our outcomes while reddish colors 
mean positive associations (higher scores reflect stronger relationships between national 
identification, greater national narcissism and greater conservatism, and limiting contact, 
physical hygiene, and policy support measures). 
 
 





Figure 3. Relation between collective concerns and public health measures in 67 countries 
and territories. The coefficients reflecting the relationship between national identity and each 
of the health measures are presented for each country from strongest (top) to weakest 
(bottom). The relationship with physical contact (red), policy support (green), and hygiene 
(blue) are color coded. 
 




Finally, we explored whether the relations between predictors and outcomes 
varied across countries as a function of HDI. The relations between national 
identification and each of the three public health measures were not moderated by 
HDI. On the other hand, we found that HDI moderated the relation between national 
narcissism and spatial distancing, such that this relation was negative in countries 
that had higher HDI scores but positive in countries that had lower HDI scores. We 
also found that HDI moderated the relation between right-wing political ideology and 
hygiene, such that this negative relation was stronger in countries that had higher 





Our research suggests that national identities might play an important role in 
the fight against a global pandemic. Following World War II, early work in social 
psychology had a tendency to focus on the negative side of nationalism and 
leadership persuasion, such as destructive obedience to authority (Milgram, 1963) 
and group conformity to incorrect beliefs held by others (Asch, 1956). In the decades 
since then, research on social identity (Tajfel, 1978) and a “social cure” approach to 
mental health (Jetten, Haslam & Haslam, 2011) has revealed that there is also a pro-
social side to group identity. Based on this latter perspective we predicted, and 
found, that national identification was positively associated with public health support 
around the globe.    
Individual differences in the strength of identification with one’s nation robustly 
predicted public health support, operationalized as behavioral health intentions 
(physical distance and physical hygiene) and support for COVID-19 policy 
interventions. In short, people who identified more strongly with their nation reported 
greater engagement with critical public health measures around the globe.4 These 
results are consistent with the social psychological literature on the benefits of 
identifying with one’s social groups. It also underscores a potential benefit of national 
identification which might be particularly salient during a national or global health 
crisis (Beider, 2020). Our research provides evidence that this form of identification 
might help to understand public health behaviors and deliver effective campaigns to 
promote those behaviors during a global pandemic that confined citizens to their 
homes and countries. Future work should examine the potential benefits of identity 
appeals during a pandemic and aim to isolate the causal influence of national identity 
on real behavior. 
 
4 It is unclear how immigrants and refugees, who may not be living in their country of citizenship, 
respond to issues of identity during a public health crisis. We flag this as an important area for future 
research. 




There is reason to believe that other forms of group identification can 
undercut public health. For instance, recent research has found that partisanship 
within countries (i.e., when people strongly identify with a specific political party) is 
associated with risky behavior (Gadarian et al., 2020), including spatial distancing 
(Gollwitzer et al., 2020; see also Alcott et al., 2020). One paper that used geo-
tracking data from 15 million smartphones in the US found that counties that voted 
for a Republican (Donald Trump) over a Democrat (Hillary Clinton) exhibited 14% 
less spatial distancing during the early stages of the pandemic. These partisan gaps 
in distancing predicted subsequent increases in infections and mortality in counties 
that voted for Donald Trump. Moreover, partisanship was a stronger predictor than 
many other economic or social factors (e.g., county-level income, population density, 
religion, age, and state policy). This may be due to leadership, social norms, and 
media consumed by people from different identity groups. As such, stronger group 
identification is not always associated with healthy behavior. 
It is tempting to conclude that political ideology might account for these 
relationships. However, we found that right-wing political ideology had a positive, 
moderate correlation with both national identity and narcissism, but very weak 
correlations with support with public health measures in our multi-country sample. 
Specifically, right-wing political beliefs were associated with less support for COVID-
19 protection, compared to left-wing political beliefs. This relationship between 
political beliefs and compliance has been observed in several countries (e.g., 
Capraro & Barcelo, 2020; Gollwitzer et al., 2020; Ponce, 2020). Similarly, while 
national identification and national narcissism were associated positively with 
support for public health measures, right-wing political ideology was negatively 
associated. This suggests that a collective identity might lead people to value the 
protection of the entire group during a pandemic, even after adjusting for their 
ideological differences. This can be seen as the positive side of national identity and 
how it might be leveraged in a global crisis to promote activities that benefit a 
society. 
It is also important to note that the relationship between national identity and 
public health support was distinct from national narcissism. In past research, national 
narcissism has predominantly been linked to problematic attitudes towards both out-
group and in-group members (Cichocka, 2016; Cichocka & Cislak, 2020; 
Marchlewska et al., 2020). However, we found that national narcissism was 
positively associated with self-reported physical hygiene and support for COVID-19 
preventative policies. Still, these effects were much smaller than those for national 
identity and depended on the context (i.e., national narcissism was associated with a 
lower likelihood of reporting spatial distancing in relatively more economically 
developed countries). Future work should thus carefully consider cross-national 
differences in human development as well as local norms associated with national 
identity. It is also noteworthy that there was an unexpected negative link between 
HDI and self-reported health behaviors. It is unclear why this link exists but future 
work might examine if people in less developed countries place greater faith in their 
political and medical institutions during the early stages of a pandemic or whether 
they are motivated to report higher support for public health guidelines. 
Implications 




Our evidence suggests that national identity may have modest predictive 
value for people's endorsement of and adherence to public health measures in the 
context of COVID-19. This information may be leveraged to create a sense of 
inclusive nation-based in-groups, potentially increasing engagement with 
recommended policies. Political and public health leaders might be able to similarly 
adapt effective communication strategies to appeal to a sense of national 
identification. Indeed, this might be particularly helpful in highly polarized countries 
where adherence to public health recommendations has become a partisan issue 
(see Gollwtizer et al., 2020). For instance, Canadian leaders across the political 
spectrum adopted similar messaging about the serious risks of the current pandemic 
which resulted in a rare moment of cross-partisan consensus among the public 
(Merkley, Bridgman, Loewen, Owen, Ruths, & Zhilin, 2020). Such recategorizations 
to overarching inclusive national groups (e.g., Gaertner et al., 2016) may be effective 
for preventing unhealthy behaviors. As such, leaders who wish to inspire public 
health behavior might benefit from connecting the issue to feelings of national 
identity. Framing these messages at the level of the nation rather than, for instance, 
a partisan group, region, or municipality also makes sense in the context of a 
pandemic, which requires national (and international) coordination in the public 
health sector (Dovidio et al., 2020; Harari, 2020).  
However, we note the effective application of these appeals requires future 
research as national identity is also implicated in intergroup conflict. This is more 
likely in the case of national narcissism (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020; Golec de Zavala 
et al., 2009), which tends to be associated with lower solidarity with other nations in 
the crisis (e.g., Gorska et al., 2019). In the absence of such narcissism, national 
identity could reflect not only concerns about protecting one’s own country, but also 
into concern for other nations. Indeed, prior research has found that national 
identification is associated with more positive attitudes towards other nations--
especially when adjusting for national narcissism (Cichocka et al., 2016; Golec de 
Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). Thus, the nature of national identity might be an 
important determinant of the effectiveness of identity and the potential for 
international cooperation. In addition, it could turn out that a commitment to 
cosmopolitanism or other supranational identities and ideologies may play a role that 
bolsters what we have seen in the case of national identity (Liu, Zhang, Leung, 
Zuniga, Gastardo-Conaco, Vasiutynskyi, & Kus-Harbord, 2020).  
 
Limits on generalizability 
The vast majority of published research in psychology and social sciences 
has been conducted in so-called WEIRD cultures (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 
2010), typically restricted to the narrow western and educational setting of American 
or European university students, and non-representative participants from 
industrialized, rich and democratic countries. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, is 
a truly global issue, currently affecting over 200 countries and territories all over the 
world. We aimed to collect representative samples to help make generalizations to 
the wider population within each country as well as the broader sample of countries 
around the globe. Although we managed to collect data from 67 countries and 
territories, we were nevertheless unable to ensure representative samples from 
many countries or even conduct our survey in other countries (especially in many 
African countries as well as the Middle East). Therefore, our inferences apply to 
nations where we managed to complete this research and the specific samples we 
obtained. 




The current research was correlational and conducted during the early phase 
of the pandemic. While a causal relationship between national identification and 
public health behavior makes sense from a theoretical perspective, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that public health behavior actually causes national identification, 
or that both are caused by a third variable (e.g., Bieber, 2020). Moreover, we have 
no evidence whether this pattern would apply during later stages of the current or 
future pandemics. Indeed, it is possible that national identity increases during times 
of crisis as people recognize their duty as citizens to help respond to this issue. We 
encourage future work to examine ways to experimentally manipulate the salience of 
national identification or frame health messages in a way that highlights the link 
between identification and the public health measures. A related issue is the critical 
need to measure actual behavior rather than behavioral intentions or policy support 
(see Isler, Isler, Kopsacheilis, & Ferguson, 2020) as well as consider access to the 
necessary resources to engage in health behavior. 
Another limitation, hinted at above, is the exclusive focus on national groups 
rather than, for instance, participants’ tendency to identify with their city, region, 
religion, or ethnic group — or, for that matter, all of humanity. Some research 
suggests that local leaders might be ineffective if their advice contradicts a national 
leader (see Gollwitzer et al., 2020). In the current pandemic, nation-states have been 
among the most important actors for implementing policy or promoting national 
health guidelines, but sub-national units and international organizations such as the 
World Health Organization (WHO) have also played an important role. Our data do 
not examine whether sub- or supra-national identities play a similar role in driving 
public health attitudes and behaviors but we encourage future work on this topic.  
Conclusion 
The COVID-19 pandemic spreading across the world is one of the most 
devastating global health crises of the century. Until a verifiably safe and effective 
vaccine or therapeutic treatment is widely available, efforts to inspire collective action 
for greater compliance with public health measures become the central challenge 
when mitigating the transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (e.g., spatial distancing, 
physical hygiene and support for health policies). Our large-scale international 
collaboration across 67 countries suggests that identification with one’s nation is 
positively associated with support for critical public health measures. Understanding 






















Methods and Analysis 
 
In April 2020, we launched a call using social media to collect data all over the  world 
on psychological factors that might be related to COVID-19 pandemic response, with 
public health support as the primary outcome. Each team was asked to collect data 
from at least 500 participants, representative with respect to gender and age, in their 
own country or territory. We created a survey in English (see below) that we sent to 
each team. The survey was approved by the ethics board at the University of Kent.5 
Where necessary, each team translated the survey into the local language, using the 
standard forward-backward translation method, and then collected the data. The 
datasets were then collated and analyzed using multi-level models. We report how 
we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all 
measures in the study (see supplement). 
Participants 
We collected data from a total of 67 countries (n = 46,769 participants; Mean 
age = 43.09; Gender = 51.8% females)6. Figure 1 shows the geographical 
distribution of countries included in the project (For a full list and sample 
characteristics from each country, please see supplement). The sample includes 
countries from all continents (except for Antarctica).7 
We encouraged teams to collect nationally representative samples. Of the 67 
countries in which data were collected, representative samples were achieved in 30 
and convenience samples were collected in 34, and both types of sampling were 
used in three countries. All the analyses reported in our paper were repeated 
controlling for differences in sampling method. Although some coefficients differed as 
a function of sampling procedure, none of these differences compromised or altered 




Questionnaires were administered online. Each participant completed a series 
of psychological measures and self-reported public health behaviors (see complete 
survey with all items in supplement). Participants completed the scales in random 
order. 
 
5 Each team was allowed to include additional items after the main survey under their own institutional 
protocol. 
6 50,944 participants answered the survey. We first excluded those participants that did not answer 
more than 75% of the survey. This first cut resulted in a sample of 48,895 participants. Then, we cut 
those younger than 18 y/o or older than 100 y/o which resulted in a sample of 48,764. Finally, we cut 
those that failed on an attentional check task; with this, we achieved the final sample of 46,769. 20 
countries were able to collect representative samples with respect to sex and age. 44 countries were 
able to collect more than 500 subjects. 
7  Some are overrepresented (e.g., Europe, Americas) while others are underrepresented (e.g., 
Africa, Middle East). 
8 For example, type of sampling moderated the slope between physical hygiene and national 
identification. The mean slope was .124, and the estimated slope for countries that collected 
representative samples was .146, whereas it was .102 for countries that collected convenience 
samples. In other words, the main finding appeared to be slightly stronger in the more representative 
samples. 




For the current paper, we focused on three potential predictors of public 
health support. Our primary predictor was a two-item national identification measure 
(which included one item from Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2012 and an additional 
item measuring identity centrality from Cameron, 2004): “I identify as (nationality)” 
and “Being a (nationality) is an important reflection of who I am”. One secondary 
predictor was a three-item national narcissism scale (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, 
Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009), which include the following sample item: “My 
(national group) deserves special treatment.” The nationalities were provided by the 
survey researchers. These measures used an 11-point slider scale with three labels 
items: 0 = “strongly disagree”, 5 = “neither agree nor disagree”, 10 = “strongly 
agree”.  
As a third predictor, we included a one-item measure of political ideology: 
“Overall, how would you best describe yourself in terms of political ideology?”. This 
measure used a scale from 0 = extremely liberal/left-leaning to 10 = extremely 
conservative/right-leaning).9 This single-item measure of ideology has been found to 
account for a significant proportion of the variance in presidential voting intentions in 
American National Election studies between 1972 and 2004 (Jost, 2006). We 
included the terms left-leaning and right-leaning to make the item generalizable to 
numerous political systems. 
As the primary outcome variable, we included three measures of public health 
support. A spatial distancing scale, consisting of five items, as, for example, “During 
the days of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, I have been staying at home as 
much as practically possible”.10 A physical hygiene scale, consisting of five items, as, 
for example, “During the days of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, I have been 
washing my hands longer than usual”. A policy support scale, consisting of five 
items, as, for example, “During the days of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, I 
have been in favor of closing all schools and universities”.  We used an 11-point 
“slider scale with three labels: 0 = “strongly disagree”, 50 = “neither agree nor 
disagree”, 100 = “strongly agree”, which was re-coded to a scale from 0 to 10. 
To see if these relationships varied as a function of socio-economic factors 
and the state of the pandemic in each country, we examined several country-level 
factors. Specifically, we included the 2018 (most recent available) Human 
Development Index (ranging from 0 to 1), which represents a combined index of life 
expectancy at birth, level of education (mean years of schooling for adults over  25 
and expected years of schooling for children), and national wealth (gross national 
income per capita; Human Development Report, 2019). To ensure our results were 
not confounded with the pandemic rate across countries, we measured the total 
COVID-19 infection and mortality cases (as well as the infection and mortality rate 
per capita) in each country at the start of data collection for this project.11 These 
variables had no impact on the results and are not discussed further. All measures 
will be made publicly available upon publication at the Open Science Framework 
website. 
 
9 Note that the meanings of 'left' and 'right' vary by cultural and political context (see Aspelund, 
Lindeman, & Verkasalo, 2013). 
10 Prior to conducting our analyses, we learned that the five-item scale had low reliability (alpha = 
.002). However, after dropping one bad item the scale had acceptable reliability (alpha = .72). As 
such, all analyses reported in the paper use this four-item version of the scale. 
11 Our main findings were robust even after adjusting for total infections and deaths as well as 
infections and deaths per capita at the start of data collection for this project (April 17, 2020; Dong, 
Du, & Gardner, 2020). 






We conceptualized the data as a multi-level data structure in which persons 
were nested within countries, and we analyzed the data with a series of multi-level 
models (MLM) using the program HLM (Raudenbush et al., 2011; see Nezlek, 2010, 
for a description of using MLM to analyze data from multinational studies). The 
analyses examined within-country (person-level) relationships between behavioral 
health protective responses to COVID-19 (i.e., spatial distancing, physical hygiene, 
and policy support) and individual differences in collective concerns (i.e., national 
identification, national narcissism, and political ideology). We also examined the 
moderating effects of country-level differences on these person-level relations. For 
instance, we examined if these person-level relations between collective concerns 
and health protective measures varied as a function of between-country differences 
in overall human development as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) 
or national rates of COVID-19 infections and mortality. 
Descriptive statistics and reliability of person-level measures 
Before examining relations between COVID-19 protection and socio-political 
attitudes, we examined the reliability of our measures (with the exception of political 
ideology, which was measured with only one item). These analyses consisted of 
models in which the i items in a scale were nested within j persons, which were 
nested within k countries. Such analyses provide the multi-level equivalent of a 
Cronbach’s alpha (Nezlek, 2017; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The model is below.  
 
Level 1 (item-level):               yijk = π0jk + eijk 
Level 2 (person-level):           π0jk = b00k + r0jk 
Level 3 (country-level):          b00k = g000 + u00k 
 
In the level 1 model, yijk is response i, for person j, in country k, π0jk is a 
random coefficient representing the mean response for person j in country k, b0j is a 
random coefficient representing the mean of y for country k (across the j persons in 
each country), eijk represents the error associated with each measure, and the 
variance of rijk constitutes the within-country variance. In multi-level modeling, the 
coefficients from one level of analysis are passed up to the next. In the level 3 
model, g000 represents the grand mean of the country level means (b00ks) from the 
person-level model, u00k represents the error of b00k, and the variance of u00k 
constitutes the level 3, country level variance. 
These analyses suggested that, with the exception of spatial distancing, our 
scales were at least “moderately” reliable (alpha > .60; Shrout, 1998). The reliability 
estimates and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. For spatial distancing, 
follow-up analyses indicated that a reliable scale could be created from items 1, 3, 4, 
and 5. Item 2 asking about visiting friends, family or colleagues was therefore 
dropped from the final analyses. 




The estimated means suggest that people generally reported following the 
guidelines for contact and hygiene and they supported policies that were intended to 
reduce the impact of COVID-19 (i.e., means for all three measures were above 8, on 
scales ranging from 0 to 10). Moreover, although the majority of the variance in 
national identification, national narcissism, and political ideology was within-country, 
there was also notable between-country variance. This justified further analyses of 
relations between country-level means of these measures and HDI. We calculated 
scale means and used Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2017) to estimate multi-level 
correlations for person-level measures, controlling for the nested structure of the 
data (see Table 1). 
 
Country-level relations between HDI and the means of person-level measures 
 
The next set of analyses examined relations between scores on the HDI and 
the means of the person-level measures. This model was a variant of the 
unconditional model. HDI scores were entered as a predictor in the country level 
model presented above (level 3). MLM analyses do not estimate standardized 
coefficients, and to simplify the interpretation of the results, HDI scores were 
standardized prior to analysis (and, therefore, were entered uncentered). 
Note that these analyses took into account the reliability of scales. By nesting 
items within persons, we estimated a latent mean for each construct. Although the 
results of analyses of two-level models that did not estimate latent means but used 
observed means (persons within countries) were indistinguishable from the results 
we present here, we present the results of the three models because they are more 
accurate than the results of the two-level analyses. 
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2. For all measures, 
except political ideology, there were negative relationships between HDI scores and 
country-level means. Note that the coefficients in the table represent the change in a 
country-level mean associated with a 1 SD increase in HDI scores. In other words, 
citizens in countries with higher scores on the global Human Development Index also 
reported less support for COVID-19 public health measures. Effect sizes are defined 
as the percent reduction in the country-level variance of a null model (Table 2) 
associated with the inclusion of HDI scores at the country-level. Because political 
ideology was measured with only one item, the variance estimates and effect size for 
political ideology are from a two-level model (persons nested within countries). 
Estimating effect sizes for multilevel analyses such as those used in the present 
study are discussed in Nezlek (2010). 
 
Person-level relations between collective concerns and public health support. 
 
Next, we examined person-level relations between the three COVID-19 
protection measures (modeled as outcomes) and national identification (NI), national 
narcissism (NN), and political ideology (PI) (modeled as predictors). Predictors were 
defined as the mean scores for each scale. To account for relations among the 
predictors, all predictors were entered at the person level of the model. Predictors 
were entered group-mean centered and were modeled as randomly varying. Again, 
because this was done using a three-level model, outcomes were measured in terms 
of latent means.  




Entering predictors group-mean centered meant that estimates of coefficients 
controlled for country-level differences in means (Nezlek, 2010). Entering predictors 
as randomly varying meant that the model took into account the possibility that 
slopes varied between countries. In essence, a regression equation, consisting of an 
intercept and a slope, was estimated for each country, and these estimates were 
“passed up” to the country level where they were tested for significance. The model 
is below (item level is not shown).  
Level 2 (person-level):           π0jk = b00k + b01k*(NN) + b02k*(NI) + b03k*(PI) + r0jk 
Level 3 (intercept):                 b00k = g000 + u00k  
Level 3 (NN slope):                b00k = g010 + u01k 
Level 3 (NI slope):                 b00k = g020 + u02k 
Level 3 (PI slope):                  b00k = g030 + u03k 
The hypothesis of interest was tested by assessing the significance of the 
g010, g020, and g030 coefficients in this model. Was the mean slope between an 
outcome and a predictor significantly different from 0? The results of these analyses 
are summarized in Table 3. These unstandardized coefficients represent the 
expected change in an outcome for a one-unit increase in a predictor, i.e., an 
increase of one on a scale (out of 11). Also, the random error terms for all predictors 
were significant at p < .001. 
As can be seen from the coefficients presented in Table 3, national 
identification was the most reliable and strongest predictor of our COVID-19 public 
health support measures (see Figure 2 for the coefficients in each country). It was 
significantly and positively related to all three measures (even after adjusting for 
national narcissism and political ideology). Individuals with stronger national 
identification (relative to other people within their own nation) reported stronger 
support for limiting physical distance and improving physical hygiene than individuals 
with weaker identification, and they also endorsed COVID-19 public health policies to 
a greater extent.  
National narcissism was significantly positively related to two of the three 
protective measures (albeit weakly). Individuals scoring higher in national narcissism 
supported recommendations for physical hygiene and endorsed COVID-19 related 
policies more strongly compared to individuals with lower levels of national 
narcissism.  
The relations between political ideology and public health support were 
negative (albeit weakly) for all three outcome measures, indicating that individuals 
with more left-leaning or liberal political orientation tended to adhere to 
recommendations for contact, hygiene and supported COVID-19-related policies 
more strongly than those with more right-leaning or conservative political orientation. 
Effect sizes were estimated using a similar procedure that was used for 
estimating effect sizes at the country-level. Effect sizes were defined as the percent 
reduction in the person-level variance of a null model (Table 2) associated with the 
inclusion of the three predictors (collective narcissism, national identification, and 
political ideology) at the person-level. The three predictors accounted for 8% of the 
person-level variance of the contact measure, for 7% of the person-level variance of 
the hygiene measure, and 5% of the person-level variance of the policy support 
measure. 




Next, we examined if person-level relations (slopes) between collective 
concerns and COVID-19 public health support varied across countries as a function 
of HDI by adding HDI scores to the level 3 model that examined slopes. The 
relations between national identification and each of the three public health 
measures were not moderated by HDI. Indeed, we observed only two modest 
moderating effects.  
 
We found that HDI moderated the relations between national narcissism and 
spatial distancing (g011 = -.031, t = 3.44, p < .05). The relation between national 
narcissism and spatial distancing was negative in countries that had higher HDI 
scores (the estimated slope for a country +1 SD on the HDI was .037) but positive in 
countries that had lower HDI scores (the estimated slope for a country -1 SD on the 
HDI was .025).  We also found that HDI moderated the relation between political 
ideology and hygiene (g031 = -.017, t = 2.23 p < .05). The overall negative relation 
between right-wing political ideology and hygiene was stronger in countries that had 
higher HDI scores (the estimated slope for a country +1 SD on the HDI was -.032) 
than in countries that had lower HDI scores (the estimated slope for a country -1 SD 
on the HDI was .002, functionally 0). However, we note that these effects were not 
statistically significant at the p < .001 threshold so we recommend interpreting them 
with caution. 
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Summary of Samples. N stands for the sample size. Gender is coded as follows: 
1=male, 2=female, 3=other (only 0.3% of the total sample reported gender=3). 
Standard deviations are reported in brackets. Cases/million and Deaths/million 
represent the number of cases (deaths) per million inhabitants at the start of data 
collection. Some countries have smaller sample sizes that fall short of n = 500; even 
so, we decided to include them in the analysis as MLM takes into account different 
numbers of observations. 
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Details about the survey 
Participants took, in random order, the following scales: 
● A limiting physical contact scale, consisting of five items, as, for 
example, “During the days of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, I 
have been staying at home as much as practically possible”. 
● A physical hygiene scale, consisting of five items, as, for example, 
“During the days of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, I have been 
washing my hands longer than usual”. 
● A policy support scale, consisting of five items, as, for example, “During 
the days of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, I have been in favor 
of closing all schools and universities”. 
● A generosity measure, measuring the proportion of the daily wage in 
the corresponding country a participant would keep for themselves vs. 
give to a national charity vs. give to an international charity (Sjåstad, 
2019). 
● A two-item psychological well-being scale (Bjørnskov, 2010). 
● A three-item collective narcissism scale (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, 
Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). 
● A two-item national identification scale (one item from Postmes, 
Haslam, & Jans, 2012 and additional item measuring identity 
centrality). 
● A COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs scale, consisting of four items such as 
“The coronavirus (COVID-19) is a bioweapon engineered by 
scientists.” 
● A six-item open mindedness scale (Alfano et al, 2017). 
● A seven-item morality-as-cooperation scale (Curry, Chesters, & Van 
Lissa, 2019). 
● A two-item trait optimism scale (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). 
● A four-item social belonging scale (Malone, Pillow, & Osman, 2012). 
● A four-item trait self-control scale (Tangney, Boone, & Baumeister, 
2018). 
● A one-item self esteem scale (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). 
● A six-item narcissism scale (Back, Küfner, Dufner, Gerlach, 
Rauthmann, & Denissen, 2013). 
● A ten-item moral identity scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002). 
● A COVID-19 risk perception scale, consisting of two items such as “By 
April 30, 2021: How likely do you think it is that you will get infected by 
the Coronavirus (Covid-19)?” Available answers from 0% to 100%, with 
10% increments. 
● A one-item political orientation scale. Participants were asked: “Overall, 
what would be the best description of your political views?”. Available 
answers from 0 = very left leaning to 10 = very right leaning. 




● A moral circle measure (Waytz, Iyer, Young, et al., 2019). 
● A subjective physical health measure. Participants were asked: “In 
general, how would you rate your physical health as it is today?”. 
Available answers from 0 = “extremely bad” to 10 = “extremely good”. 
After these scales, participants took a three-item cognitive reflection test (CRT). The 
test was a reworded version of the test proposed by Frederick (2005); we reworded 
the items because the classic CRT is very well known. After the CRT, participants 
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